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This dissertation consists of three essays in applied microeconomics. Each chapter covers a
large category of public spending in the US: (1) health care; (2) social insurance; and (3) education.
This dissertation aims to understand the determinants of efficient delivery of public programs,
focusing on disadvantaged subpopulations.
The first chapter looks at the effectiveness of health care systems. Medicaid, the largest public
health insurance program in the US, has transitioned from a fee-for-service system (FFS) primarily
administered by the government to a managed care system (MMC) administered by private insur-
ers over the last few decades. I examine how hospitals’ responses to financial incentives under
these two systems affect hospital costs and newborn health outcomes. I analyze the universe of in-
patient discharge records across New York State from 1995-2013, totaling 4.5 million births. First,
I exploit an arbitrary determinant of MMC enrollment: infants weighing less than 1,200 grams
were excluded from MMC and were instead served through FFS. Using a regression discontinuity
design, I find that newborns enrolled in MMC stayed fewer days in hospitals and thus had less ex-
pensive visits relative to newborns enrolled in FFS. The cost difference is driven by birth hospitals
retaining more newborns enrolled in FFS while transferring away those enrolled in MMC. I find
that MMC had limited impacts on newborn health, measured by in-hospital mortality and hospital
readmission. Hospitals tended to transfer out MMC newborns only when a high-quality hospi-
tal was nearby, which resulted in these infants receiving uncompromised care. Second, I exploit
county-level rollout of the MMC mandate to examine impacts on the full population of infants
using a difference-in-difference design. I find that hospitals achieved a similar rate of cost savings
as for infants over the 1,200-gram threshold, while length of stay, the probability of transfer, and
mortality did not change following the mandate. This finding suggests that there are alternative,
successful methods by which hospitals reduce costs under MMC, including for high-risk deliveries.
The second chapter argues that wealth uncertainty influences when couples choose to retire.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, I show that wives delay retirement when their
husbands retire following a job loss. This effect is stronger when husbands are the primary earners,
and couples are relatively poorer. This provides evidence of intra-household insurance that miti-
gates the impact of an unexpected earnings shock. I find that wives tend to delay retirement only
until they become eligible for Social Security. This suggests that Social Security benefits can relax
households’ budget constraints and allow wives to join their husbands in retirement.
The third chapter focuses on heterogeneity in grade retention decisions in New York City public
schools. Performance on proficiency exams can be a key determinant of whether students are
retained or “held back” in their grade. We find female students in New York City are 25% more
likely to be retained in their grade due to exam failure than boys. Hispanic students are 60% more
likely and Black students 120% more likely to be retained due to exam failure (relative to White
students). Poverty and previous poor performance also increase the likelihood of retention, while
being young for grade or short does not. We conclude that “patterned discretion” exists in how
standardized test results are utilized.
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Chapter 1. How Do Hospitals Respond to Managed Care?
Evidence from At-Risk Newborns
1.1 Introduction
Health care spending in the US is notoriously high. In 2014, the US government spent $1.1
trillion on public health insurance programs. 40% of US children are covered by Medicaid, the
means-tested health insurance program funded by states and the federal government. To reduce
costs, Medicaid has transitioned from the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) system administered by
the government to the Medicaid Managed Care (MMC) system administered by private insurers
– up from 10% of Medicaid enrollees in the early 1990s to 74% by 2013 (Duggan and Hayford,
2013; CMS, 2015a). This transition is expected to continue as several states expand their MMC
programs. Despite this systematic change, the existing literature finds mixed impacts of MMC on
both cost and health outcomes, providing little support for the transition to MMC.
This paper examines whether MMC can incentivize hospitals to reduce costs without compro-
mising patient health. I exploit variation in the probability of MMC enrollment at a birth weight
cutoff: infants weighing less than 1,200 grams (2 pounds, 10 ounces) were excluded from manda-
tory enrollment in MMC in New York State and were instead served through the traditional FFS
system (NYSDOH, 2000, 2001). I compare infants whose birth weight falls just below the thresh-
old and thus enroll in FFS with infants whose birth weight falls just above the threshold and thus
enroll in MMC in a regression discontinuity (RD) design. While local, my estimates are impor-
tant because they focus on the most expensive newborn deliveries. Infants that weigh below 1,200
grams account for one percent of the total newborn population but incur approximately one-third
of total newborn hospital costs. This suggests that potential cost savings relative to FFS are large.
Moreover, infants around the cutoff are at-risk newborns whose health outcomes are highly depen-
dent on the quality of care. The mortality rate of infants near the threshold is ten times higher than
the overall rate. If MMC compromises the quality of care, cost savings might be traded off against
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health outcomes.
Under the traditional FFS system, Medicaid reimburses hospitals directly for each service that
they provide. The fact that costs were not seen by hospitals may have encouraged over-provision
of care with dubious health benefits (Hackbarth et al., 2008; Arrow et al., 2009). Under MMC,
Medicaid pays a fixed fee per month per enrollee to intermediary health plans that reimburse hos-
pitals. This fixed fee structure under MMC incentivizes health plans to: (1) cut down unnecessary
care in order to minimize cost; and (2) keep their enrollees healthy so as to avoid incurring future
costs. A priori, MMC’s incentive structure might restrain the excesses of FFS. In practice, MMC
may fail to achieve its intended goals for several reasons. First, MMC may lead to under-provision
of care. “Churning,” the phenomenon of beneficiaries cycling in and out of Medicaid, reduces the
incentive of health plans to promote the long-term health of their enrollees. The reduced incentive
to manage the quality of care can result in adverse health outcomes. Second, the success of MMC
is contingent on hospitals’ financial incentives. Since MMC does not govern contracts between
health plans and hospitals, it is unclear how the actual providers of care would respond to the
incentives of MMC.
Focusing on hospital discharge records from New York City, I find that infants above the 1,200-
gram threshold are 23 percentage points more likely to participate in MMC compared to infants
below the threshold. I also find that they have discontinuously shorter lengths of stay and thereby
have less expensive visits compared to infants below the threshold. The cost difference is driven
by birth hospitals transferring more infants above the threshold to other short-term hospitals while
holding onto lucrative infants below the threshold. Tracking infants across hospitals, I find that the
cumulative length of stay and hospital costs are still lower above the threshold. These differences
suggest that hospitals internalize financial incentives to reduce costs for MMC infants. I provide
additional evidence that financial incentives do indeed drive these hospital responses. Consistent
with a profit maximization problem of hospitals, effects are stronger when hospitals’ spatial con-
straints bind (i.e., when they have few Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) beds available) and
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when potential receiving hospitals have spare capacity. In addition, the effects are stronger for
infants with high expected costs of treatment.
Although costs and care change, I find limited evidence that the reduced amount of care pro-
vided to infants above the threshold results in worse health outcomes, as measured by individual-
level mortality during hospitalization and the incidence of hospital readmission following the birth
episode. I show that receiving hospitals are on average bigger and better-equipped than birth hos-
pitals. Consequently, infants enrolled in MMC are likely to be transferred away; however, these
transfers occur to higher-quality hospitals, resulting in minimum harm to health. These results
suggest that MMC reallocates at-risk newborns from a lower-quality hospital to a higher-quality
hospital.
I propose a mechanism through which hospitals might engage in such behavior in response to
MMC: efficient coordination of care between local hospitals. In contrast to the above findings in
New York City, I show that there are no differences between MMC and FFS in counties outside
of New York City. This suggests that the structure of local health care markets may impact how
hospitals respond to MMC. In particular, I consider distance from a birth hospital to a high-quality
hospital with a NICU as a possible factor driving the differences between New York City and
upstate counties. I find that hospitals are in fact more responsive to MMC when they have a high-
quality hospital nearby, even within New York City. This suggests that even if MMC motivates
hospitals to selectively transfer infants to maximize their profits, the cost of timely transfers may
outweigh the financial benefit for some hospitals due to the lack of an efficient coordination system.
As is well known, RD estimates apply to those with a high probability of being near the thresh-
old (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) and may not apply to other subpopulations. To address this, I exploit
the rollout of the MMC mandate across counties in New York State in a difference-in-difference
(DD) framework. I find that the DD estimates are comparable to my RD estimates for low birth
weight infants. For infants with higher birth weight, I also find that hospitals achieve a similar
level of cost reductions without affecting mortality. However, length of stay and the probability of
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transfer do not change for this group following the MMC mandate, suggesting that hospitals adjust
the amount of care conditional on retaining these infants.
I also consider the average characteristics of “compliers” for both RD and DD models. Com-
pliers for the RD model are infants who are induced to enroll in MMC due to exceeding the birth
weight threshold at 1,200 grams. Compliers for the DD model are infants who are induced to
enroll in MMC due to living in a county at the time of the MMC mandate rollout. I find that two
groups of compliers are quite different. For example, compliers in the RD model stay in hospitals
that have more beds, staff, and equipment compared to compliers in the DD model, who also have
much higher birth weight. This suggests that treatment effects for these two models could differ
since hospitals with varying observable characteristics may respond differently to incentives asso-
ciated with MMC. Indeed, the means by which cost reductions are achieved differ. Nevertheless,
the overarching finding of lower cost but similar health outcomes under MMC persists.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses my contributions to
the related literature. Section 1.3 provides relevant institutional details. Section 1.4 describes my
data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 1.5 describes the main empirical strategy, while
Section 1.6 presents the main RD estimates and discusses the mechanism. To further understand
hospitals’ financial incentives, Section 1.7 explores three sources of heterogeneity: capacity at birth
hospitals, capacity at potential receiving hospitals, and expected costs of treatment. Section 1.8
discusses several specification and robustness checks of the main results. Section 1.9 presents the
DD estimates and compares complier characteristics between the DD and RD estimates. Section
1.10 discusses conceptual framework and cost implications. Section 1.11 concludes.
1.2 Contributions to the Relevant Literature
This section summarizes the relevant literature and discusses my contributions. The current
literature on MMC has three limitations. First, there is no consensus on the effects of MMC as the
findings in the literature are mixed. Second, few papers focus directly on provider-level responses,
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thus limiting our understanding of the mechanisms. Third, most papers focus on relatively healthier
subpopulations who might have little room for cost reductions and health improvements. This
paper attempts to address each of these three points.
First, I utilize a type of variation that has not been previously explored to identify the effects of
MMC. I exploit a discontinuous exclusion from MMC enrollment based on birth weight in an RD
framework. To complement my RD strategy, I also estimate a DD model using county-level rollout
of the MMC mandate in New York State. Moreover, I compute mean characteristics of compliers
for both RD and DD models to further understand the differences between these two models.
Several papers use local MMC mandates as an exogenous source of variation in a DD frame-
work, but the findings are mixed. For instance, Duggan (2004) focuses on the impact on Medicaid
expenditures using a local MMC mandate in California as a source of variation. He finds that an
MMC mandate in California led to an increase in government spending with no health improve-
ment, suggesting that MMC in fact decreased the program efficiency. His findings, however, do
not always apply to a similar study in other states. For example, Harman et al. (2014) show that the
MMC mandate in Florida led to a reduction in Medicaid expenditures. On the other hand, using
datasets that represent a national sample, Herring and Adams (2011) and Duggan and Hayford
(2013) find no overall effects on expenditures.
Similarly, the findings on the effects of MMC on health outcomes are also inconclusive. Sev-
eral papers focus on pregnant women and infants as they account for a large share of Medicaid
beneficiaries. Aizer et al. (2007) examine prenatal care and birth outcomes in California and find
that MMC actually decreased the quality of prenatal care and increased the incidence of low birth
weight, pre-term births, and neonatal mortality.1 Their findings suggest that providers can respond
to MMC by limiting care for certain subpopulations, resulting in adverse effects on health.2 On the
1Conover et al. (2001) also find that MMC led to poor prenatal care and negative birth outcomes (lower Apgar
scores, but no effect on infant mortality). In addition, Kaestner et al. (2005) document similar findings—poor prenatal
care and birth outcomes—but show that their estimates are unlikely to be causal.
2Kuziemko et al. (2013) provide evidence on risk-selection under MMC. They find that the transition from FFS to
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contrary, some of the earlier findings suggest improvements in prenatal care (Krieger et al., 1992;
Levinson and Ullman, 1998; Howell et al., 2004).
Second, I focus on hospital responses to MMC and propose a hospital-level mechanism through
which MMC can achieve its goals. Few papers in the literature directly discuss mechanisms and
most focus on health plans’ incentives. Duggan and Hayford (2013) show that states with high
baseline Medicaid reimbursement rates achieved savings, suggesting the government’s ability to
negotiate lower prices with health plans as a mechanism for reducing health care expenditures
under MMC.3 In addition, Van Parys (2015) examines Florida’s 2006 Medicaid reform and dis-
cusses that the types of competing health plans in regional health care markets affect how health
plans reduce costs. Although it is useful to understand plan-level incentives, the lack of attention
on provider-level incentives limits our understanding of how MMC can influence actual provider
practice.4
Third, I focus on a high-cost subpopulation - low birth weight infants. Newborns are one of the
costliest populations treated in US hospitals. In 2011, aggregate hospital costs on newborns were
ranked on top among those billed to Medicaid and private insurance (HCUP, 2013). In particular,
as Figure 1.1 shows, only around 1% of infants weighed less than 1,200 grams at birth, but they
accounted for 22.3% of total costs between 1995 and 2013 in New York State. The literature
focuses on relatively healthier subpopulations because most of the local MMC mandates exclude
disabled subpopulations and high-cost procedures are often carved out of benefit packages.5 As
MMC widened black-Hispanic (i.e., high- and low-cost infants) disparities in birth outcomes, suggesting that health
plans shift their resources towards low-cost enrollees.
3Their findings are consistent with the literature on managed care in the private insurance market. For example,
Cutler et al. (2000) examine the effects of managed care on price and quantity of health care for the privately insured,
focusing on patients with heart disease. They show that unit prices (i.e., reimbursement payments) are lower under
managed care than the traditional indemnity insurance, while they find relative modest differences in quantity (i.e.,
treatment patterns) and health outcomes.
4Marton et al. (2014) discusses how plans reimburse providers greatly affects the reduction in utilization and
spending, suggesting that provider-level incentives play a key role in the success of MMC.
5One exception is the Florida’s Medicaid reform that Van Parys (2015) studies. Florida required disabled benefi-
ciaries who received Medicaid through Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to enroll in MMC. However, Van Parys
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a number of states have begun to expand MMC to those with critical conditions (Iglehart, 2011;
Libersky et al., 2013; KFF, 2015), however, it is timely and policy-relevant to understand whether
MMC can successfully deliver medical care to these populations.
This paper is also related to the literature on hospital responses to a change in prices.6 Dafny
(2005) shows that hospitals “upcode” patients to take advantage of large price increases for certain
diagnoses.7 Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) find a large increase in capital-labor ratios following
a reform that decreased reimbursement for labor input. Shigeoka and Fushimi (2014) find an in-
crease in NICU utilization following a reform that made it more profitable in Japan. I contribute to
this literature by examining how hospitals respond to a change in reimbursement rates for severely
ill patients.
Moreover, this paper is related to the literature on returns to early life medical care. Almond
et al. (2010) estimate marginal returns to medical care in early life using the very low birth weight
classification at 1,500 grams and find that the higher level of medical care below the threshold
results in lower mortality. Bharadwaj et al. (2013) use the same identification strategy and find that
more medical care in early life leads to higher test scores in the long-term. I focus on a different
cutoff at 1,200 grams to examine how different reimbursement methods affect hospitals and early
life health care.
1.3 Background
In this section, I provide institutional details on MMC in New York State focusing on newborns.
Section 1.3.1 describes mandatory enrollment in MMC in New York State and discusses imperfect
compliance with the mandate. Section 1.3.2 describes the exclusion of newborns from mandatory
enrollment in MMC based on birth weight. Section 1.3.3 discusses hospital payments under FFS
(2015) does not separately focus on examining the effects of MMC on this disabled subpopulation.
6Some papers focus on physicians’ financial incentives. For example, see Clemens and Gottlieb (2014).
7See also Sacarny (2014) & Geruso and Layton (2015).
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versus MMC in treating low birth weight infants.
1.3.1 Mandatory MMC Enrollment in New York State
Medicaid beneficiaries in New York State are generally required to enroll in a managed care
plan. The mandatory enrollment in MMC was phased in starting October 1997 in Albany and four
other upstate counties. In New York City, the MMC mandate was introduced in August 1999 and
was fully implemented in September 2002. As of November 2012, MMC was mandated in all 62
counties. However, the actual share of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC falls short of 100%.
In July 2015, two and a half years after the full implementation, only 78% of the New York State
Medicaid population were enrolled in MMC while the rest were still enrolled in FFS.8
Figure 1.2 shows the trends in the share of infants covered by Medicaid in New York State
using inpatient discharge records. Medicaid coverage has increased over time, and around half of
all births were financed through Medicaid in 2013. The composition of Medicaid coverage has
changed dramatically over the study period. In 1995, only about 5% of total Medicaid infants were
covered by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), a type of managed care organizations
(MCOs), while the rest 95% were covered by non-HMO. By 2013, 83% of total Medicaid infants
were enrolled in HMOs, and the rest 17% were served through non-HMO. I use Medicaid HMO
and MMC interchangeably in the remainder of the paper based on the comparison between the
managed care penetration published by Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the
share of Medicaid infants enrolled in HMO in my sample.9
The share covered by HMO is not 100% even after the statewide implementation of the man-
date due to three reasons. First and foremost, there are a few infants who are still covered by
8http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/share-of-medicaid-population-covered-under-
different-delivery-systems/
9According to CMS (2015b), the Medicaid managed care penetration rate in New York State increased from
61.5% in 2005 to 76.7% in 2011. In my sample of infants in New York State, the share of Medicaid infants enrolled
in HMO increased from 62.1% in 2005 to 76.2% in 2011. This suggests that Medicaid HMO is a good measure of the
total MMC participation in New York State.
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Medicaid FFS due to exclusions and exemptions from the MMC enrollment. I exploit one of the
exclusions for my identification strategy, which I describe further in the following section. Sec-
ond, some infants who are newly enrolled in Medicaid might show up as having the FFS coverage
in the discharge records at birth, in case their parents fail to enroll their child in a managed care
plan in a timely manner.10 Third, even for infants who are subject to mandatory enrollment, the
implementation might not be perfect or immediate due to some administrative shortcomings.
1.3.2 Exclusion Below the 1,200 Grams Birth Weight Threshold
Infants born to pregnant women who are receiving Medicaid on the date of delivery are auto-
matically eligible for Medicaid for one year. If the mother is enrolled in a health plan that provides
an MMC option, the child is automatically enrolled in the mother’s plan in most cases. When the
infant weighs less than 1,200 grams, however, the system receives an alert with an indicator from
the hospital noting that the infant should not be enrolled with an MCO for the first six months of
their lives. They are instead served through the FFS system. This creates a discontinuous exclu-
sion from MMC based on birth weight, which I exploit in an RD framework to estimate the causal
effects of MMC in comparison to FFS.
These infants with very low birth weight were excluded from MMC enrollment along with
other subpopulations that are medically complicated and expensive to treat. For example, nursing
home residents and people residing in state psychiatric facilities were also excluded from MMC
enrollment during the study period (Sparer, 2008). Given the high costs of treatment and clin-
ical complications, these groups were excluded initially due to several concerns raised by both
health plans and beneficiaries. Health plans had little experience with severely ill subpopulations
and lacked the coordinated delivery system for them. Beneficiaries were also concerned about
inadequate provider networks under MMC.
However, the state has been gradually phasing in mandatory enrollment into MMC for these
10Newly enrolled Medicaid beneficiaries are given 90 days to choose a health plan.
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subpopulations, mainly for greater cost savings. As part of the Medicaid Redesign Team (MRT)
initiatives, infants weighing less than 1,200 grams at birth have been no longer excluded from
MMC enrollment since April 2012.11 Therefore, this paper has direct policy implications on
whether MMC can achieve cost reductions without harming health outcomes of critically ill new-
borns.
1.3.3 Hospital Payments Under FFS Versus MMC
Under FFS, hospitals are directly reimbursed by Medicaid in a uniform manner. In New York
State, the Medicaid program uses a prospective payment system using Diagnosis Related Groups
(DRGs) to reimburse health care providers for inpatient services they provide to FFS enrollees.
Each inpatient visit is classified into a DRG based on patient conditions, and Medicaid pays a fixed
rate to hospitals according to the DRG assigned to the patient (Quinn, 2008).
Under MMC, Medicaid pays health plans a flat fee per month per enrollee (i.e., capitation) and
health plans are responsible for reimbursing hospitals for inpatient services. Therefore, hospital
payments under MMC vary depending on contractual details between health plans and hospitals.
Health plans choose a wide range of methods in reimbursing providers, from a fee-for-service
method to capitation. For inpatient services associated with newborn medical care, however, most
health plans in New York State also use a prospective payment system using DRGs.
Since health plans have an incentive to reduce costs given the fixed revenue structure, prospec-
tive payment to hospitals under MMC are likely lower than the hospital payments under FFS.
According to the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH), the actual hospital payments
under FFS are in fact higher than the suggested hospital payments under MMC.12 Refer to Ap-
pendix Section A for further details on hospital payments. I discuss a conceptual framework of
11http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/program/update/2012/2012-02.htm#infants
12The suggested hospital payments are intended to be used as base rates where adjustments can be made
based on the contracts between health plans and hospitals (http://www.health.ny.gov/facilities/hospital/
reimbursement/apr-drg/rates/ffs/index.htm).
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hospital responses to different levels of prospective payment in Section 1.10.1.
1.4 Data
For my main analysis, I use inpatient discharge records from State Inpatient Databases (SID)
of Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) for New York State from 1995-2013.13 This
dataset contains the universe of inpatient discharge records, thus almost all births. This dataset con-
tains critical information for my identification strategy such as birth weight in grams and primary
expected payer. I examine the effects of MMC on various measures of inpatient care including
total charges, length of stay (LOS), transfer, and mortality during hospitalization. Starting 2003,
New York State Inpatient Databases include encrypted person identifiers that enable researchers to
identify multiple hospital visits of the same patient over time. This allows me to distinguish births,
transfers, and subsequent visits.
In addition, I use American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals from
1995-2013.14 This dataset contains detailed information on hospitals such as hospital names, loca-
tion, staff, and facilities. I use these various hospital characteristics to understand the mechanism
through which MMC affects hospital practice.
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics of my main analysis sample, infants in New York State
from 2003-2011. I focus on periods between 2003 and 2011 to exploit encrypted person identifiers
to track patients over time and to exclude the periods when the exclusion was no longer valid.
Among the full sample of newborns in the first column, 43% of the total 2 million discharge
records are financed by Medicaid. Within Medicaid, 62% of infants are covered by HMO.
Total charges are list prices for all services provided at the facility to each discharge record.
The list price for a given service is the same for all patients regardless of their insurance status.
Discounts are applied to list prices for actual payments based on contractual details between each
13Data access to HCUP was provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
14Access to AHA was also granted by NBER.
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insurer and hospital. Although total charges are not the exact payments made by insurers, they
are a good proxy for the amount of services provided to a given patient. Total costs are total
charges multiplied by hospital-year-specific cost-to-charge ratios. This measure is considered to
better reflect how much hospital services actually cost. Total costs are considerably lower than
total charges, $3,500 compared to $9,609 on average.15 In the full sample, infants stay on average
four days in the hospital. Death is a rare event, around 0.3%. Around 1% of the total newborns
experience transfers, and 10% stay in a NICU facility.
The last two columns show means for the sample near the 1,200-gram threshold. Below the
threshold, 95% of Medicaid beneficiaries are enrolled in a non-HMO category, which indicates that
the exclusion is implemented fairly well. Hospital visits are highly expensive for these very low
birth weight infants. Total charges are over $200,000 below and $145,000 above the threshold.
Total costs are also high, $75,758 below and $52,670 above the threshold. These infants stay
hospitalized for more than a month on average. Mortality is also greater than the full sample,
which is around 5% below the threshold and 2% above the threshold. Transfers occur for more
than 10% of these infants, and the majority of them utilize NICU (74-75%).
1.5 Empirical Strategy
To examine the effects of MMC in comparison to FFS, I exploit the 1,200-gram threshold in
a regression discontinuity design. That is, I compare infants whose birth weight falls just below
the 1,200-gram threshold and thus are served through Medicaid FFS to infants whose birth weight
falls just above the threshold and thus are enrolled in MMC. I estimate the following regression to
examine the first stage effect of exceeding the threshold on MMC participation. Then, I proceed to
examine the reduced-form effects on several discharge outcomes Yi:
Yi = α + βDi + f (Xi) + φy + φm + ψc + ui (1)
15All monetary values are in 2011 dollars adjusted by CPI-U.
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where i denotes a discharge record. Di is a binary variable that takes one if the birth weight
of a record i is greater than or equal to 1,200 grams. Xi indicates a running variable, which is
birth weight centered at 1,200 grams. I control for a trend in birth weight with a linear spline,
f (Xi) = Xi + Di Xi. Additionally, to increase precision, I control for admission year fixed effects
(φy), admission month fixed effects (φm), and hospital county fixed effects (ψc). Excluding these
additional controls has little impact on the results.
For bandwidth selection, I employ a bandwidth selection method proposed by Calonico et al.
(2014) for each outcome. This method suggests a bandwidth ranging from 100 to 200 grams for
my main outcome variables. I estimate these models with Ordinary Least Squares (i.e., local linear
regressions with a uniform kernel). In the tables, I specify the bandwidth used for each estimation
and report the RD estimate β with robust standard errors.16 As a robustness check, I additionally
examine whether the estimates are sensitive to a range of bandwidth choices and functional forms
of f (Xi).
The main identifying assumption of my RD design is that control over birth weight is imprecise
(Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Figure 1.3 shows the frequency of discharge records by birth weight.
Panel (a) plots the histogram using one-gram bins. There are large heaps at multiples of 10 and
smaller heaps at multiples of 5, most likely due to rounding in reporting. Other than that, however,
there is little evidence of irregular heaps around 1,200 grams. Panel (b) plots the same information
using 20-gram bins along with local linear regression fitted lines. For figures, I estimate local linear
regressions using the triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 150, separately for below and above the
threshold. Again, it shows that the mean frequency is smooth across the threshold. McCrary (2008)
test also indicates that the discontinuity estimate is not statistically significant at the 5% level.
In addition, I test whether birth weight is manipulated for infants with high expected costs.
Specifically, I compute predicted list prices from regressing total charges on principal diagnosis
and principal procedure fixed effects. I then divide the sample by quartiles of the predicted list
16Clustering standard errors at the birth weight level does not affect the results (Card and Lee, 2008).
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prices. I find no evidence of heaping across the distribution, even for infants in the top quartile of
expected costs (Appendix figure C.1). Taken together, I find no evidence of manipulation around
the 1,200-gram threshold.
Additionally, I repeat the estimations dropping infants at 1,200 grams (“donut RD”) to test
whether the tendency to round to 1,200 grams is correlated with other characteristics that are
also correlated with my outcomes (Barreca et al., 2011). I find that my results are robust to this
restriction, suggesting that the observed heaps are likely random and thus do not interfere with
identification.17
To further test the validity of the RD design, I examine whether observed predetermined char-
acteristics are similar around the threshold. Since it is difficult to accurately predict birth weight
prior to delivery, predetermined characteristics of patients and birth hospitals are unlikely to change
discontinuously across the threshold. Table 1.2 summarizes the RD estimates for these baseline
characteristics. As expected, none of the estimates are statistically significant, indicating that the
exclusion in fact created random variation in enrollment into MMC.
1.6 Main Results
In this section, I present main results separately for New York City in Section 1.6.1 and for
counties outside of New York City in Section 1.6.4. Section 1.6.5 considers proximity to a high-
quality hospital as a potential mechanism behind the main findings.
1.6.1 New York City
1.6.2 Provider Practice Outcomes
Since treatment at birth can change the course of subsequent hospital care, I distinguish visits
at birth from subsequent visits. Panel A of Table 1.3 shows the RD estimates at birth hospitals
17My results are also robust to excluding other large heaps and to restricting the estimations to large heaps only.
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and Figure 1.4 presents the corresponding figures. Consistent with the policy, panel (a) of Figure
1.4 shows that the MMC participation rate discontinuously increases above the threshold. This
corresponds to an increase of 23 percentage points, which constructs a fuzzy RD design.18 The
MMC participation rate below the threshold is close to zero, which indicates that the exclusion
from MMC enrollment based on birth weight is strictly implemented.
I show that the higher MMC rate is associated with shorter length of stay, lower charges and
costs, consistent with hospitals’ incentives to reduce the amount of care for infants enrolled in
MMC. Column 2 of Table 1.3 shows that length of stay drops by 12% above the threshold.19 The
large reduction in length of stay results in lower charges and lower costs by similar magnitudes.
The reduction in length of stay could be driven by (1) faster routine discharges from a birth
hospital or (2) transfers from a birth hospital to another facility for additional care. I first examine
the transfer decision. An inter-hospital transfer is an option for infants who require specialized or
intensive care if they are born in inadequately-equipped facilities. For infants below the thresh-
old, hospitals have an incentive to retain them to extract higher payments. However, since the
risk of treating the infants at relatively inadequate facilities may be too great further below the
threshold, hospitals would keep the healthiest among the infants enrolled in FFS, those right below
the threshold. For infants above the threshold, this incentive essentially disappears, and hospitals
would rather have an incentive to transfer them. I find that the probability of transfer to another
short-term hospital in fact increases by 2.4 percentage points above the threshold. In addition,
panel (e) of Figure 1.4 shows that the effect is driven by the lower likelihood of transfer right
18The composition of Medicaid beneficiaries might be affected due to differential selection into Medicaid following
the MMC mandate. The managed care mandate can make Medicaid participation more appealing for infants above
the threshold, while it does not affect those below the threshold as they are excluded from the mandate. For instance,
assuming the quality of care is higher under managed care, some families who otherwise would not participate in
Medicaid might decide to enroll in Medicaid (Currie and Fahr, 2005). In addition, given that families covered by
MMC are given time to choose a health plan, timing of Medicaid enrollment might vary at the threshold. To minimize
selection, I do not restrict my estimation to Medicaid participants. In the RD estimation window 52% of the sample
have Medicaid, 43% have private insurance, 5% are uninsured.
19To be specific, I use log(length of stay+1) as the outcome. Using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to
avoid adding an arbitrary number one yields the same result.
15
below the threshold.20
I examine whether the shorter length of stay is driven by faster routine discharges by focus-
ing on infants who are routinely discharged from birth hospitals. I find no effects on length of
stay or cost measures for this group of infants (e.g., RD estimate for log(length of stay): -0.017;
standard error: 0.026). Note that infants who are routinely discharged below the threshold are not
comparable to those above the threshold due to the differential probability of transfer across the
threshold. Nevertheless, a smooth linear fit around the threshold (Appendix Figures C.2) suggests
that transfers are likely the main driver of the reduction in length of stay at birth hospitals.
The majority of transfers occur soon after birth. In my sample, 70% of transfers occur within
the first three days after birth (Figure 1.6). Additionally, health plans have limited control over
hospitals’ decisions on neonatal transfers. Due to the emergency of neonatal transfers, prior au-
thorization by insurers is not required (NYSDOH, 2016). This suggests that transfer decisions are
essentially made by hospitals. Moreover, hospitals that receive transferred infants in my sample are
“higher-quality” hospitals. Figure 1.7 compares mean characteristics of birth hospitals and receiv-
ing hospitals. Receiving hospitals on average have more beds, physicians, and nurses. They are
more likely to be teaching hospitals and more likely to have a NICU facility. These hospital char-
acteristics suggest that infants in my sample are generally transferred to higher-quality hospitals
that are bigger and better-equipped.
Exploiting the encrypted person identifiers, I further examine how MMC affects subsequent
care provided to infants around the birth weight threshold. Panel B of Table 1.3 shows the effects on
individual-level outcomes that aggregate outcomes at birth hospitals with outcomes at subsequent
visits including transfers (if transferred). The corresponding figures are shown in Figure 1.5.
I find that the magnitudes of the shorter length of stay, lower charges, and costs are smaller
when aggregating the amount of care provided at subsequent visits. However, length of stay is
20I examine other dispositions such as transfer to other facilities (e.g., skilled nursing facility, intermediate care
facility) and home health care, but I find no effects on these measures.
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still shorter above the threshold by 9% and the estimate is marginally significant at the 10% level.
When including hospital fixed effects (panel C of Table 1.3), the point estimates barely change but
precision increases. This suggests that the effects in fact come from within-hospital differences in
treatment depending on the infant’s insurance status. With hospital fixed effects, the 9% reduction
in total costs becomes marginally significant.
1.6.3 Health Outcomes
In this section, I test whether the reduced amount of care provided to infants above the threshold
results in worse health outcomes. First, I examine mortality at birth hospitals. If FFS infants receive
more resources than MMC infants even among those who remain at birth hospitals, there may be
negative health consequences for infants enrolled in MMC at birth hospitals. I find that the point
estimate is positive but insignificant (RD estimate: 0.019; robust standard error: 0.016). However,
since the probability of transfer changes at the threshold, there may be selection into who remains
at birth hospitals, which can differentially affect the probability of death across the threshold.
Subsequently, I track the infants over time and estimate the probability of hospital readmission
and individual-level mortality during hospitalization (columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.3 panel B). If
the reduced amount of care provided to infants above the threshold at birth was inadequate, the
probability of hospital readmission might be higher above the threshold. I find no evidence of
that: the point estimate on hospital readmission is zero and statistically insignificant (RD estimate:
-0.000; robust standard error: 0.021). This suggests that the reduction in total length of stay at
birth may have improved efficiency by cutting down unnecessarily long stays.
The point estimate on individual-level mortality, however, is positive and large although sta-
tistically insignificant (RD estimate: 0.015; robust standard error: 0.016). In addition, it is only
slightly lower than the estimate at birth hospitals, suggesting that the difference in mortality at birth
hospitals are unlikely driven by selection. This is not surprising since more than half of all deaths
I observe occur within the first three days following birth. This result suggests a potential shift in
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resources at birth hospitals from infants above the threshold towards infants below the threshold.
Nevertheless, given limited precision, it is hard to conclude that MMC had significant impacts on
health outcomes.21
Additionally, I examine various outcomes associated with the quality of care and patient health,
including hospital readmission due to preventable conditions,22 level IV NICU stays, any NICU
stays, utilization of chest X-rays, ultrasounds, and implants, as well as various therapy services
(Appendix Table D.1). I do not detect any statistically significant effect on these measures except
for one outcome. For utilization of physical therapy services, I find an increase of 4 percentage
points above the threshold, suggesting that if anything MMC may be associated the higher quality
of care.
1.6.4 Rest of the State
In this section, I repeat the estimations for counties outside of New York City. Table 1.4
summarizes the effects on discharge outcomes at birth hospitals (panel A) and aggregated outcomes
at the individual level (panel B). Appendix Figures C.3 and C.4 show the corresponding figures.
In counties outside of New York City, I find few differences between MMC and FFS. The prob-
ability of MMC participation increases discontinuously at the threshold by 15 percentage points,
which is slightly lower than the New York City estimate. Panel (a) of Appendix Figure C.3 shows
that the Medicaid HMO participation is close to zero below the threshold, while it jumps discon-
tinuously to around 20% above the threshold. Unlike New York City, however, I find no effects on
all other discharge outcomes in this sample. The estimates are positive and imprecise. Figures also
show little evidence of discontinuous changes in outcomes across the threshold.
The lack of effects on discharge outcomes outside of New York City suggests that local health
21Adding various controls (e.g., diagnosis fixed effects) does not reduce standard errors of my mortality outcomes.
22I follow the definition of avoidable hospitalizations in Parker and Schoendorf (2000) and Dafny and Gruber
(2005).
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care markets may play a role in hospital responses to MMC. Since New York City is unique in many
aspects compared to the rest of the state, there could be numerous channels through which MMC
affects hospitals. For instance, the number of plans is much larger in New York City compared to
the rest of the state, which could affect the level of competition in local health care markets and
thus the strength of incentives to reduce costs and improve quality.23 The density of local health
care markets can also have an impact on hospital practice style by allowing hospitals to coordinate
the provision of care to local patients. In Section 1.6.5, I pay particular attention to the role of
proximity between hospitals in understanding this geographical heterogeneity.
1.6.5 Potential Mechanism
In this section, I consider proximity to a potential receiving hospital as a potential mechanism
that drives the differences between New York City and the rest of the state. The idea is that costs of
transfer may be lower in New York City due to shorter distances between hospitals. The costs may
include transportation costs, transaction costs between originating and receiving hospitals, and
potential harm to infants’ health. There are risks associated neonatal transfers,24 and the literature
documents that the longer duration of transport is associated with increased neonatal mortality
(Mori et al., 2007) and poor physiologic status of newborns (Arora et al., 2014).
In particular, I focus on the distance from a birth hospital to a hospital with a NICU as a poten-
tial receiving hospital. Focusing on hospitals with a NICU is a natural choice since the majority
of infants near the threshold utilize NICU. To illustrate the geographical difference between New
York City and the rest of the state, I first measure straight-line distances. Specifically, I geocode
the center point of each hospital zip code and compute the distance from a birth hospital to the
23Unfortunately, simple comparisons by the number of plans are fraught with the endogeneity of plan entry and
exit, and I do not have a valid instrument for the number of plans to further investigate this mechanism in the current
project.
24For instance, Arad et al. (1999), Mohamed and Aly (2010), Nasr and Langer (2011) & Nasr and Langer (2012)
document neonatal transfers are associated with higher mortality and more complications. However, since transfers
are not randomly assigned, the resulting outcomes are confounded by selection into transfers.
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nearest hospital that provides a NICU facility. The distance between hospitals is much shorter in
New York City compared to other counties outside of New York City (Appendix Figure C.5). The
median distance is 1.3 miles in New York City and 18 miles outside of New York City.
To examine whether proximity predicts hospitals’ practice style, I compare hospitals that have
a hospital with a NICU close by with hospitals that have a hospital with a NICU far away relative
to the median driving time within New York City. Driving time between hospitals is the relevant
measure of proximity since the main mode of neonatal transport is ground ambulance (Ohning,
2015). Specifically, I compute driving time using Google Map APIs from each birth hospital to the
nearest hospital with a NICU.
Table 1.5 shows that even within New York City, the reduction in length of stay and the in-
crease in the probability of transfer are driven by hospitals with shorter driving time to the nearest
hospital with a NICU. This suggests that proximity to a potential destination hospital plays an im-
portant role in birth hospitals’ decision-making process. Given the longer driving distance between
hospitals outside of New York City, transfer decisions might depend less on financial incentives
but more on medical needs, which are unlikely to change discontinuously at the threshold.
This finding suggests that hospitals engage in profit-seeking behavior in response to financial
incentives associated with MMC, but only when they can minimize the potential harm and costs
through expedient transfer to a high-quality hospital. This finding is consistent with the growing
literature that documents that health care providers respond to financial incentives but they are not
willing to sacrifice the health of their patients in doing so (Ho and Pakes, 2014).
1.7 Heterogeneity in New York City
To further understand how hospitals respond to MMC in New York City, I conduct three het-
erogeneity analyses. In Section 1.7.1, I examine the role of capacity at birth hospitals. Section
1.7.2 examines the role of capacity at potential receiving hospitals. In Section 1.7.3, I examine
predicted list prices of newborns to evaluate whether hospitals are especially responsive to infants
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who are costly to treat.
1.7.1 Capacity at Birth Hospitals
Here, I further explore hospitals’ incentives to transfer away infants with less generous pay-
ments. Suppose that the number of NICU beds is fixed, and the hospital decides whether to retain
a low birth weight infant at its own NICU facility or to transfer the infant to another hospital
following birth. Although entering the NICU market has a large fixed cost, marginal costs of pro-
viding neonatal intensive care is relatively low. Therefore, the hospital has an incentive to utilize
empty beds.25 That is, as long as the reimbursement payments are higher than the relatively mod-
erate marginal costs, the hospital can increase its profits by retaining infants enrolled in both MMC
and FFS. When the hospital is spatially constrained, however, the hospital can benefit more from
holding onto infants enrolled in FFS than those enrolled in MMC. Therefore, incentives to transfer
infants enrolled in MMC are likely pronounced when the hospital has few NICU beds available.
To test this hypothesis, I exploit variation in monthly NICU utilization. Specifically, I define
the NICU occupancy in a given month as the number of infants admitted last month and stayed in
a NICU facility for at least 10 days.26 I use the number of infants admitted last month to avoid
counting the endogenous number of NICU stays in the contemporaneous month as a measure of
how crowded NICU is. To ensure that infants who leave the hospital soon after birth are not
included in the occupancy measure, I restrict length of stay to be at least 10 days. Given that the
mean length of stay for very low birth weight infants is longer than a month, 10 days is unlikely to
be a binding restriction.
I compare months when the NICU occupancy is below the median with months when the
NICU occupancy is above the median at a given hospital in a given year. Within hospital-year
25Freedman (2016) tests this hypothesis and finds that empty beds increase NICU utilization.
26Appendix Figure C.6 plots this NICU occupancy measure for each month for an example hospital in a given year.
It shows that there is large variation in NICU utilization across months.
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comparisons ensure that the comparison is made at fixed capacity since the number of NICU beds
is unlikely to change dramatically for a given hospital in a given year. The results are shown in
panels A and B of Table 1.6. When the NICU occupancy is above the median, the reduction in
length of stay, total charges, and total costs are large and significant around 20%; and the proba-
bility of transfer also increases by 4 percentage points. When the NICU occupancy is below the
median (i.e., hospitals have enough number of beds), I find little impact of MMC on all outcomes,
consistent with the spatial constraint playing an important role.
Since the NICU occupancy at the month level27 cannot directly be compared to the number
of NICU beds, high NICU occupancy may not indicate that the hospital is close to capacity. To
address this issue, I create a crowdedness measure that is relative to hospital capacity. The mean
length of stay for infants who stayed in a NICU facility for at least 10 days is 34 days. Thus,
dividing the NICU occupancy, which is computed at the month level, by the number of beds yields
a crude measure of the daily NICU occupancy rate. I compare below- and above-median months
using this measure and find similar results (Appendix Table D.2). This supports the above finding
that hospitals’ incentives become stronger when they are spatially constrained.
1.7.2 Capacity at Potential Receiving Hospitals
Since hospitals have a financial incentive to utilize empty beds, I examine the role of crowded-
ness at potential destination hospitals. I consider two types of potential destination hospitals: (1)
the nearest hospital with a NICU facility following Section 1.6.5; and (2) a “typical destination”
hospital, which I define as the receiving hospital of the majority of (any) neonatal transfers from a
given hospital.28
27I observe the admission month and the discharge month but do not observe the exact date of admission or dis-
charge. Due to this data limitation, I am unable to identify exactly how many of NICU beds are occupied on a given
day.
28In my sample, around 32% of total transfers occur to the nearest hospital with a NICU; and around 51% of total
transfers end up at typical destination hospitals.
22
As in Section 1.7.1, I use the NICU occupancy to measure how crowded the potential destina-
tion hospital is. Table 1.7 shows that the effects are stronger in months when the nearest hospital
with a NICU is relatively less crowded. Similarly, I find that the birth hospital is more likely to dif-
ferentially treat infants across the threshold when its typical destination is relatively less crowded
(Appendix Table D.3). This suggests that MMC may have induced hospitals to engage in realloca-
tion of at-risk infants from a crowded hospital to a less crowded hospital via transfers.
In addition to the incentive to utilize empty beds, receiving hospitals with high-quality may
have another incentive to accept the transferred infants. When health plans and hospitals negotiate
over hospital payments for Medicaid patients, hospital quality plays a crucial role in determining
the bargaining power of hospitals. That is, higher-quality hospitals likely have more bargaining
power and thus command higher prices (Gaynor et al., 2015). In my sample, receiving hospitals are
generally bigger and better-equipped, suggesting that they may face relatively modest incentives
to differentially treat infants enrolled in FFS versus MMC.
1.7.3 Expected Costs of Treatment
In this section, I examine which group of infants is most affected by hospitals’ financial in-
centives. Unless the reimbursement payments are perfectly adjusted for severity, infants with high
predicted costs of treatment are especially costly to hospitals. Therefore, profit-maximizing hos-
pitals are more likely to respond to infants whose marginal costs are high. To test this hypothesis,
I create a measure of predicted costs of treatment. Specifically, I compute predicted list prices by
regressing total charges on principal diagnosis fixed effects and principal procedure fixed effects.
This measure thus estimates the expected total charges solely based on the severity of patients’
conditions.
Consistent with the hypothesis, I find that hospital responses are stronger for infants with higher
predicted list prices (Table 1.8). For infants with below-median predicted list prices, MMC reim-
bursement payments may still exceed the marginal costs and hospitals are unlikely to treat infants
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differentially across the threshold on the extensive margin (i.e., the retention versus transfer mar-
gin). For infants with above-median predicted list prices, the lower reimbursement payments under
MMC may not cover the expected costs of treatment for these infants and thus birth hospitals are
more likely transfer out infants above the threshold. Consequently, infants with severe condi-
tions may be transferred to higher-quality hospitals, which suggests a potential improvement in the
match between the patient and hospital.
For infants with above-median predicted list prices, however, I find that mortality during hospi-
talization at birth hospitals increases above the threshold and the estimate is marginally significant
at the 10% level. This suggests that hospitals may shift resources towards infants under FFS with
higher reimbursement payments, resulting in harming health among the most high-risk subpopu-
lations under MMC. When I follow the patients over time, the individual-level mortality during
hospitalization for this subgroup is still large, although insignificant (RD estimate for individual-
level mortality: 0.032; robust standard error: 0.023). Albeit with limited precision, this suggests
that MMC may adversely affect health for infants with the most severe conditions.
1.8 Specification and Robustness Checks
As a specification check, I test whether the estimates are robust to the choice of bandwidth
and the degree of polynomials. I repeat the estimations varying bandwidths from 100 grams to
500 grams in 50-gram increments for each outcome. I use quadratic and cubic polynomials in
addition to the linear polynomial to control for trends in birth weight. Appendix Figure C.7 shows
the RD estimates by bandwidth for different degrees of polynomials. Overall, all panels show that
the RD estimates are not sensitive to the choice of bandwidth and the degree of polynomials. In
particular, the estimates for log(length of stay) and the probability of transfer are stable across
different choices of bandwidths and polynomials, supporting my main specification.
One issue associated with identification using the birth weight threshold at 1,200 grams is that
it coincides with one of the conditions that qualify children for the Supplemental Security Income
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(SSI) program, which provides monthly cash payments and Medicaid to beneficiaries. However, I
argue that SSI participation is likely to have a limited impact on medical care of newborns. First,
monthly cash payments are unlikely to affect families’ health care utilization conditional on Med-
icaid participation. When the child is in a medical facility, monthly cash payments are limited to
$30. Since the amount of cash payments is fairly small and services provided to newborns enrolled
in Medicaid are exempt from copayment, SSI payments are unlikely to alter families’ incentives to
utilize health care conditional on Medicaid participation. Additionally, the average monthly bene-
fit for children was $633 in December 2014 (Duggan et al., 2015). Given the substantial amount
of income transfer low-income families can expect outside of a medical facility, there may be an
incentive for families to leave the facility early. However, this would go against finding a reduction
in length of stay above the threshold.
If SSI participation based on the birth weight qualification induces people to participate in
Medicaid who otherwise would not, it can affect both families and health care providers by sub-
stantially changing the cost of health care services. I examine whether the probability of receiving
Medicaid discontinuously increases below the threshold. I find that the probability of Medicaid
participation is in fact higher above the threshold and the estimate is not statistically significant
(RD estimate: 0.024; robust standard error: 0.023). Little impact on Medicaid participation is
likely due to a high baseline insured rate among very low birth weight infants, independent of SSI
participation. Given the high costs of treatment, hospitals have a strong incentive to enroll all in-
fants who qualify for a public health insurance program, if they do not already have one through
the mother. This finding suggests that SSI has limited impacts on medical care of newborns around
the 1,200-gram threshold.
Nevertheless, I conduct two exercises to test whether my results are robust to SSI participation.
First, I repeat the estimations for two other states (New Jersey and Maryland) over the same period
where the federal SSI rule applies but the exclusion from MMC does not, and I find no effects
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on discharge outcomes for this sample (panel A of Table 1.9).29 This suggests that SSI has little
impact on my findings. Second, I use the inclusion of infants weighing less than 1,200 grams
into mandatory MMC enrollment in April 2012 to test the robustness of my results. I repeat my
estimations using the discharge records of infants born after April 2012 in New York City and I
find no effects on discharge outcomes during this period (panel B of Table 1.9),30 suggesting that
my results are not driven by something other than the exclusion from MMC.
1.9 Difference-in-Difference Estimation
In this section, I employ a difference-in-difference approach using the MMC mandate rollout
across counties in New York State. The mandate was phased in starting October 1997 and was
fully implemented in November 2012. To compare DD estimates with my RD estimates, I re-
strict the estimation up to 2011 since the exclusion of low birth weight infants was lifted in April
2012. Thus, the sample consists of inpatient visits of all newborns born between 1995-2011. In
a DD framework, I estimate the effects of the MMC mandate on MMC participation and various
discharge outcomes.31 I report the coefficient of interest δ from the following regression:
Yict = λc + γt + δDct + θct +  ict (2)
where i denotes a discharge record, c denotes county, and t denotes year. I consider various
outcomes Yict such as the probability of having Medicaid HMO as the primary expected payer,
log(length of stay), log(total charges), log(total costs), the probability of transfer, and mortality
during hospitalization. I include county fixed effects (λc) and year fixed effects (γt). Dct indicates
29Additionally, I restrict the estimation to large urban areas in these two states and still find no differences below
and above the threshold.
30I also use the periods before the mandate was introduced in New York City (prior to 1999) and find no differences
at the threshold.
31Appendix Table ?? examines the change in sample composition in a DD framework. It shows that Medicaid
participation decreases following the MMC mandate, suggesting that the introduction of MMC negatively affected the
overall Medicaid enrollment.
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the years after the mandate for each county. I include county-specific time trends (θct) in some
specifications as a specification check. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Panel A of Table 1.10 shows the estimates from the baseline DD model excluding the county-
specific time trends. The probability of participating in Medicaid HMO increases by 11 percentage
points among infants following the mandate. This is smaller than the RD estimate which is around
23 percentage points, mainly due to heterogeneous compliance across counties. Column 2 shows
that the DD estimate on length of stay is negative, but the magnitude is much smaller than my RD
estimate. The DD estimates for total charges and total costs are negative and fairly close to my RD
estimates. There is no change in the probability of transfer and mortality during hospitalization
following the mandate in the whole sample of newborns.
As a check on the DD identification strategy, I estimate the model including the county-specific
time trends. Panel B shows that including the time trends has little impact on the estimates, sup-
porting the parallel trends assumption. Moreover, I employ an event study approach to examine
pre-trends. Appendix Figure C.8 shows that there is little evidence of pre-trends in the probability
of Medicaid HMO participation. These results suggest that differential time trends across counties
are unlikely to drive my findings.
The comparison between the two sets of estimates emphasizes how hospital responses can
vary across different subpopulations, suggesting that my RD estimates may have little external
validity. To further understand the differences between the two models, I take two approaches.
First, I repeat the DD estimations by birth weight groups in Section 1.9.1. Second, I compute and
compare complier characteristics in Section 1.9.2.
1.9.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimation by Birth Weight Groups
To compare the DD estimates with my RD estimates for very low birth weight infants, I repeat
the DD estimations (equation (4)) by birth weight groups. Given the small number of infants,
I aggregate all infants weighing between 600 and 1,200 grams for the DD estimation below the
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threshold. Above the threshold, I repeat the estimation for each birth weight group in 150-gram
increments. In addition, I repeat the RD estimations using 150 grams as the bandwidth for all
outcomes and compare them with the DD estimates for infants whose birth weight is between
1,200 grams and 1,350 grams. In Figure 1.8, I plot the DD estimates for each birth weight group
along with 95% confidence intervals. I plot the RD estimates along with 95% confidence intervals
from New York City in 2003-2011 in red bars for the 1,200-1,350 gram bin.
Panel (a) of Figure 1.8 shows that the probability of being enrolled in Medicaid HMO is not
affected by the mandate for infants with birth weight below 1,200 grams, which confirms that
the exclusion from the mandate is implemented well. The increase in the probability of having
Medicaid HMO is around 7 percentage points for all birth weight groups above the threshold.
Panels (b)-(f) show that for infants with birth weight between 1,200 and 1,350 grams the DD
estimates are similar to the RD estimates. The DD estimates are imprecise for these low birth
weight infants, but the RD estimates for the 1,200-1,350 gram group are generally within the
confidence intervals of the DD estimates. Since both DD and RD models identify the effects using
infants with the same range of birth weight, the similarity between these estimates supports my
main RD estimates.
The DD estimates for infants with higher birth weight suggest that hospitals do engage in some
cost-reduction measures in response to the MMC mandate for infants across the whole range of
birth weight, but potentially using different methods. Both total charges and total costs decline,
while length of stay and the probability of transfer barely change following the mandate among
heavier infants. This suggests that hospitals may achieve cost reductions for these infants by ad-
justing the amount of care on the intensive margin (i.e., conditional on retaining at birth hospitals).
Specifically, I consider other measures of health and the quality of care as outcomes (Appendix
Table D.4) and find reductions in the utilization of chest X-rays and ultrasounds. I also find sug-




To further gain insights on the differences between the RD and DD estimates, I examine hos-
pital and patient characteristics for “compliers” who comply with each of the two instruments
and compare them to the overall characteristics. Compliers in my RD context refer to those who
are induced to enroll in MMC due to exceeding the 1,200-gram threshold. Compliers under the
DD specification are those who are induced to enroll in MMC due to county-level rollout of the
MMC mandate. It is impossible to identify compliers since counterfactual outcomes are not ob-
servable, but it is possible to describe the distribution of their characteristics (Abadie, 2003). I
compute mean characteristics of the compliers following Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Almond
and Doyle (2011).32 Refer to Appendix Section B for details.
Table 1.11 presents the mean complier characteristics for both RD and DD samples. Panel
A summarizes hospital characteristics and panel B compares patient characteristics. Column 1
shows the complier mean for the RD framework in the estimation window using the bandwidth of
150 grams, while column 2 shows the overall mean characteristics within the estimation window.
Column 3 shows the complier mean for the DD specification, and column 4 shows the full sample
mean of all infants.
Comparing columns 1 and 2 in panel A, compliers and the overall sample within the RD esti-
mation window are relatively similar regarding the number of beds, staff, and admissions. A few
notable differences, however, include the number of lives covered in capitated services arrange-
ment and the share of infants covered by Medicaid. I use the 1995 values (before the mandate was
in place) for the capitated lives covered since compliers by definition have more patients covered
in a capitated payment structure contemporaneously. The number of lives covered in capitated ser-
vices arrangement is lower for compliers than for the overall sample within the estimation window.
This suggests that hospitals who previously served fewer patients covered in capitation were more
32See also Kim and Lee (2016).
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compliant to the birth weight exclusion, which is as expected since more patients in these hospitals
were induced to enroll in MMC following the mandate compared to patients in hospitals with high
baseline participation in some capitated services.
In addition, compliers tend to stay in hospitals that serve more infants covered by Medicaid.
This could be the case if hospitals with a high volume of Medicaid infants are more aware of the
policy and thus more compliant to it. Moreover, assuming there is a cost associated with treating
Medicaid managed care patients differently from traditional Medicaid patients (e.g., hiring a man-
aged care manager), hospitals might do so only when there are enough number of patients affected
by the adoption of MMC. Panel B shows that compliers are likely less advantaged subgroups.
They are more likely to be racial minorities, and they tend to live in zip codes in the bottom quar-
tile of the median income distribution. Consistent with this finding, Appendix Table D.5 shows
that the effects are driven by counties with the lowest median household income where the share
of Medicaid participation is likely high.
Similar to the compliers in the RD framework, column 3 shows that hospitals that comply with
the MMC mandate have fewer lives covered in capitated services arrangement and more infants
covered by Medicaid compared to the full sample. The DD compliers are also more likely to be
racial minorities and poor compared to the full sample. However, compliers in the DD framework
are different in many dimensions from compliers in the RD framework. They have much higher
birth weight and stay in hospitals that are less likely to have a NICU facility or to be a teaching
hospital. They also tend to have fewer beds, staff, and patients compared to the RD compliers.
This suggests that compliers in the DD framework stay in hospitals that may employ alternative
methods in achieving cost savings. Consequently, the treatment effects likely vary across these two




I develop a simple framework of provider responses to FFS and MMC under the prospective
payment system.33 I discuss under which conditions the chosen level of quantity is likely lower for
an infant enrolled in MMC than for an infant enrolled in FFS. Suppose that the hospital receives
prospective payment for providing inpatient services to a given infant based on the infant’s DRG.
I define the hospital’s profit to be revenue minus total costs.
pi(q) = R − C(q) = a · ω − C(q) (3)
where a denotes the hospital base payment and ω denotes the service intensity weight for DRG
classification. Total costs depend on q, the quantity of inpatient services provided. Note that
revenue is constant under the prospective payment system.
Intuitively, since the hospital revenue R does not depend on q, the hospital’s choice of q would
not change once R changes (from FFS to MMC). Here, I assume that the physician is the key
decision-maker who chooses the level of services provided to the infant. Additionally, I assume
that the physician’s utility depends both on the hospital’s profit and the benefits to the infant:
U (pi(q),B(q))
where B(q) denotes the infant’s total benefits from hospitalization. Let b(q) denote marginal











33I follow the basic setup from Ellis and McGuire (1986).
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Using equation (3), equation (4) can be written as
∂U/∂B
∂U/∂pi
b(q) = c(q) (5)
where c(q) > 0 denotes marginal cost. Equation (5) suggests that the physician chooses the level
of quantity that sets the weighted marginal benefit to the infant equal to the marginal cost to the
hospital. The weight M RSB,pi =
∂U/∂B
∂U/∂pi measures the rate at which the physician is willing to trade
off marginal profit to the hospital for marginal benefit to the patient. In other words, M RSB,pi
measures how much the physician values the benefits to the patient relative to the hospital profit. I
consider two cases depending on whether M RSB,pi is a function of pi.
Case 1 M RSB,pi depends on pi, i.e., there are “income effects” in the physician’s preferences.
In this case, the prospective payment amount a affects the choice of q. For instance, consider
U (pi(q),B(q)) = pi(q)B(q). Then the equation (5) becomes a·ω−C(q)B(q) b(q) = c(q). If a is lower for
an MMC infant than for a FFS infant, the slope of the physician’s indifference curve will be flatter
and the chosen level of q will be lower for an MMC infant.
However, the physician’s choice of q is unlikely to depend on the level of hospital revenue since
the amount of care provided to a single infant would have a very small effect on the total revenue of
the hospital. I consider a case where the physician’s choice of q is independent of hospital revenue
below.
Case 2 M RSB,pi does not depend on pi, i.e., there are no “income effects” in the physician’s
preferences.
Since the slope of the physician’s indifference curve does not depend on pi, the amount of
prospective payment does not affect the choice of q. For instance, consider U (pi(q),B(q)) =
pi(q) + B(q)2. Then the equation (5) becomes 2B(q)b(q) = c(q). Under this scenario, this simple
model predicts that infants enrolled in both FFS and MMC will receive the same amount of care
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even with a different level of prospective payment.
Case 2 cannot explain my empirical result showing that hospitals provide less care to infants
enrolled in MMC than to infants enrolled in FFS. This suggests the need for a theoretical model
that would rationalize how the chosen level of inpatient services could be different between MMC
and FFS when both systems use the prospective payment system.34
1.10.2 Cost Implications
In the New York City sample, I find that the overall costs aggregated at the individual level
drop by 9% In the New York City sample, I find that the overall costs aggregated at the individual
level drop by 9% for very low birth weight infants according to my preferred specification with
hospital fixed effects (panel C of Table 1.3). This amounts to an average reduction of $8,764
(=0.093×$94,237) for an infant right below the threshold in 2011 values. For average infants, I
find that the overall costs aggregated at the individual level decline by 6% (panel B of Table 1.10).
This amounts to an average reduction of $214 (=0.062×$3,446). Note, however, that total costs
are not actual payments made by insurers. With the caveat that the reduction in total costs may
not translate into actual savings in health care spending and that the cost estimates are based on
a particular sample, this suggests that hospitals indeed provide the less amount of care to infants
enrolled in MMC.
The effect on individual-level mortality is positive but imprecisely estimated with the 95% con-
fidence interval [-0.014, 0.048]. Given the wide confidence interval, it is hard to draw a conclusion
on the value of a statistical life. When evaluated at the mean effect, the implied cost of saving a
statistical life is $515,529 (=$8,764/0.017), which is fairly close to the estimate of $550,000 (in
2006 dollars) for newborns with birth weight near 1,500 grams from Almond et al. (2010). Limited
34Competitive pressure from health plans may lead to a reduction in q for infants enrolled in MMC under two
assumptions. First, bargaining between health plans and hospitals induces hospitals to choose physicians who provide
less care. Second, those physicians differentially provide less care to infants enrolled in MMC than to infants enrolled
in FFS. However, both of these two assumptions require testing and validation.
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precision on health measures, however, suggests that the reduction in costs due to MMC may be
efficient as it is achieved without harming health.
However, the current study has a few limitations in conducting a complete cost-benefit analysis.
The health measures I examine are limited and imperfect as I only observe extreme measures such
as death during hospitalization. I do not observe death or other health care utilization outside of
the inpatient setting (e.g., outpatient visits).35 In addition, there may be other forms of “costs”
besides health consequences such as non-medical costs to hospitals (e.g., lawsuits) and parental
disutility from separation/transfer, which I do not observe. For example, neonatal transfers can
cause enormous stress and anxiety to parents (Hawthorne and Killen, 2006).
1.11 Conclusion
Recognizing limitations of the FFS system, the US health care market has increasingly adopted
new payment systems that promote more efficient delivery of health care. These new systems are
generally designed to reward improvement in the quality of care without unnecessarily increasing
costs (Hackbarth et al., 2008; Arrow et al., 2009). Notably, the Affordable Care Act introduced
accountable care organizations (ACOs) for Medicare populations that share similar incentives and
goals as managed care organizations under Medicaid. This paper provides important implications
for hospital responses to these incentives.
My findings suggest that hospitals respond to financial incentives stemming from different re-
imbursement models by adjusting their practice style. Hospitals reduce costs by transferring infants
under MMC to other hospitals while holding onto infants enrolled in FFS. Hospital responses are
particularly large when they are spatially constrained and for infants with high predicted list prices.
However, I find no impact on hospital readmission and do not detect statistically significant im-
pacts on mortality during hospitalization. Given my focus on very low birth weight infants, these
findings suggest that MMC expansion to previously excluded high-cost and critically-ill subpopu-
35In future projects, I plan to examine the impact of MMC on outpatient and emergency department visits.
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lations may be successful.
In addition, I find that the effects are driven by birth hospitals that have a hospital with a
NICU nearby. This suggests that hospitals do not compromise the quality of care or patient health,
by engaging in profit-seeking behavior only when they can minimize the potential harm through
expedient coordination with a high-quality hospital. Notice that the interaction between financial
incentives under MMC and short distances between local hospitals resulted in efficient delivery
of MMC. This suggests that the structure of local health care markets may play an important role
in successful delivery of a health care system, especially for critically ill patients who require
coordination of care between local hospitals.
The overarching finding that MMC achieves cost reductions in ways that do not appear to
compromise the quality of care is robust across the RD and DD models. This is surprising given
the large differences in complier means between these two models, as shown in Table 1.11. There
are two implications of this finding. First, my estimates are fairly representative and generalizable
to the overall newborn population, as supported by the similarity between the DD complier mean
and the overall sample mean. Second, even for the highest-risk infants, the RD results suggest a
similar conclusion that costs go down while health does not seem to deteriorate. My finding of
no adverse (postnatal) health effects, however, is in contrast to negative effects on prenatal care
and worse birth outcomes found in Aizer et al. (2007). Whether there are differences between
the response of prenatal versus postnatal care to MMC, both of which affect neonatal health but
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Figure 1.1: Average hospital costs and total discharges by birth weight, New York State, 1995-2013
Notes: Average costs are computed for each 100-gram bin using total charges multiplied by cost-to-charge ratio. The
total number of discharges are computed for each 100-gram bin using the number of discharges with a birth weight
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Figure 1.2: Share of infants covered by Medicaid, New York State, 1995-2013
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Figure 1.3: Frequency of the running variable
Notes: Panel (a) plots the frequency of birth weight at each gram. Panel (b) plots mean frequency for each 20-gram
bin (dots) along with a local linear regression fitted lines (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals below and above
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(f) Mortality during hospitalization
Figure 1.4: Effects of birth weight≥1,200 grams on discharge outcomes at birth, New York City
Notes: Panels (a)-(d) plot mean values of each outcome variable for each 20-gram bin (dots) along with a local linear
regression fitted lines (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals below and above the threshold. For panels (e) and
(f) I use a bigger 30-gram bin for better visibility since transfer and death are both rare events and thus noisy. I test
whether using wider bins over-smooths the data following Lee and Lemieux (2010) but find no evidence of it. I use
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(f) 1 year mortality during hospitalization
Figure 1.5: Effects of birth weight≥1,200 grams on cumulative outcomes, New York City
Notes: Each outcome aggregates the value at the individual level including the value at transferred hospitals (if trans-
ferred). Panels (a)-(d) plot mean values of each outcome variable for each 20-gram bin (dots) along with a local linear
regression fitted lines (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals below and above the threshold. For panels (e) and (f)
I use a bigger 30-gram bin for better visibility since readmission and death are both rare events and thus noisy. I use
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Figure 1.6: Age at transfer in the first month
Notes: 90% of neonatal transfers occur within the first month following birth. In particular, 70% of transfers occur
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Figure 1.7: Characteristics of birth hospitals and receiving hospitals
Notes: Navy bars summarize mean characteristics of birth hospitals. Orange bars describe mean characteristics of
















600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600 4200 4800
Birth weight (grams)
RD estimate for New York City (2003−2011)
DD estimate for infants below the threshold













600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600 4200 4800
Birth weight (grams)
RD estimate for New York City (2003−2011)
DD estimate for infants below the threshold
DD estimate for infants above the threshold












600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600 4200 4800
Birth weight (grams)
RD estimate for New York City (2003−2011)
DD estimate for infants below the threshold













600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600 4200 4800
Birth weight (grams)
RD estimate for New York City (2003−2011)
DD estimate for infants below the threshold










600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600 4200 4800
Birth weight (grams)
RD estimate for New York City (2003−2011)
DD estimate for infants below the threshold










600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600 4200 4800
Birth weight (grams)
RD estimate for New York City (2003−2011)
DD estimate for infants below the threshold
DD estimate for infants above the threshold
(f) Mortality during hospitalization
Figure 1.8: Difference-in-difference estimates by birth weight
Notes: I estimate a difference-in-difference model by birth weight groups. Below the 1,200-gram threshold, I aggregate
infants between 600 and 1,200 grams for precision and plot the difference-in-difference estimate in a navy bar. Above
the 1,200-gram threshold, I plot the difference-in-difference estimates by birth weight groups in 150-gram increments
(black). The estimates (solid lines) are plotted with 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines). The corresponding RD
estimate for the New York City sample is shown in red (x) along with its 95% confidence intervals.
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1.13 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics, infants in New York State from 2003-2011
(1) (2) (3)
Near the 1,200-gram threshold
Full sample Birth weight∈[900,1,200) Birth weight∈[1,200,1,500]
Birth weight (grams) 3,273 1,050 1,357
Medicaid 0.427 0.544 0.508
Non-HMO 0.380 0.945 0.519
HMO 0.620 0.055 0.481
Total charges (USD) $9,609 $204,796 $145,434
Total costs (USD) $3,500 $75,758 $52,670
Length of stay (days) 3.710 46.370 33.016
Died during hospitalization 0.003 0.049 0.024
Subsequent visits 0.039 0.167 0.129
Transfers 0.010 0.127 0.107
NICU utilization 0.100 0.741 0.746
Observations 2001577 9076 11021
Notes: Total charges are list prices. Total costs are total charges multiplied by hospital-year-specific cost-to-charge
ratios. Total charges and total costs are in 2011 values adjusted by CPI-U.
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Table 1.2: Balance of covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female White Black Hispanic Asian Median income Scheduled Weekend
Panel A. Patient characteristics
Birth weight≥1,200 g -0.013 -0.023 0.026 0.015 -0.012 0.032 0.034 -0.007
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.059) (0.028) (0.018)
Observations 12701 7177 9636 7177 9636 4617 3357 10061
Mean below cutoff 0.497 0.355 0.316 0.145 0.054 2.353 0.713 0.261
Mean above cutoff 0.493 0.374 0.309 0.135 0.047 2.420 0.731 0.260
Bandwidth (grams) 250 150 200 150 200 150 150 200
NICU Teaching hospital NICU beds Physicians Nurses Total admissions Total beds Births
Panel B. Hospital characteristics
Birth weight≥1,200 g -0.002 0.009 -0.438 -7.346 -14.516 -560.159 -11.567 -97.628
(0.009) (0.014) (0.586) (11.330) (35.162) (814.747) (18.180) (98.570)
Observations 6278 10057 4184 7477 7477 7477 7477 7477
Mean below cutoff 0.955 0.715 20.7 180.1 1287.3 35357.2 753.1 4044.2
Mean above cutoff 0.945 0.698 20.4 187.4 1279.3 34946.2 732.3 3994.7
Bandwidth (grams) 150 200 100 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: Panel A shows the RD estimates for patient characteristics. Panel B shows the RD estimates for hospital
characteristics. In addition to the indicator for birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression includes a linear spline of birth
weight, admission year fixed effects, admission month fixed effects, and hospital county fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are reported.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.3: Effects of birth weight≥1,200 grams on discharge outcomes, New York City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Discharge outcomes at birth hospitals
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.228∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗ -0.109∗ -0.140∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.019
(0.018) (0.051) (0.064) (0.069) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 5490 4065 4049 3096 5490 2735
Mean below cutoff 0.033 51.7 $244,943 $93,838 0.070 0.038
Mean above cutoff 0.277 42.0 $208,055 $77,391 0.065 0.037
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Readmission Mortality
Panel B. Aggregating at the individual level
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.236∗∗∗ -0.089∗ -0.072 -0.100 -0.000 0.015
(0.018) (0.049) (0.062) (0.067) (0.021) (0.016)
Observations 5490 4065 4047 3074 4065 2735
Mean below cutoff 0.039 53.2 $250,584 $95,366 0.140 0.040
Mean above cutoff 0.284 43.5 $215,080 $79,707 0.110 0.039
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Readmission Mortality
Panel C. Aggregating at the individual level, with hospital fixed effects
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.237∗∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.057 -0.090∗ 0.003 0.017
(0.018) (0.044) (0.046) (0.054) (0.021) (0.016)
Observations 5490 4065 4047 3074 4065 2735
Mean below cutoff 0.039 53.2 $250,584 $95,366 0.140 0.040
Mean above cutoff 0.284 43.5 $215,080 $79,707 0.110 0.039
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: Panel A shows the RD estimates for each outcome from discharge records at birth hospitals. Panel B shows the
RD estimates for outcome aggregated at the individual level. In addition to the indicator for birth weight≥1,200 g, each
regression includes a linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed effects, admission month fixed effects, and
hospital county fixed effects. Panel C additionally includes hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported.
The means of logged outcomes are reported in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.4: Effects of birth weight≥1,200 grams on discharge outcomes, rest of the state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Discharge outcomes at birth hospitals
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.147∗∗∗ 0.021 0.039 0.051 0.011 0.021
(0.018) (0.065) (0.073) (0.074) (0.019) (0.014)
Observations 4571 3414 3407 3191 4571 2263
Mean below cutoff 0.032 49.1 $204,180 $75,151 0.149 0.030
Mean above cutoff 0.194 40.5 $167,210 $60,307 0.140 0.029
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Readmission Mortality
Panel B. Aggregating at the individual level
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.151∗∗∗ 0.041 0.057 0.072 -0.002 0.018
(0.018) (0.062) (0.070) (0.071) (0.021) (0.015)
Observations 4571 3414 3407 3174 3415 2263
Mean below cutoff 0.036 51.6 $212,942 $78,495 0.113 0.034
Mean above cutoff 0.204 42.4 $173,966 $63,014 0.093 0.030
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: Panel A shows the RD estimates for each outcome from discharge records at birth hospitals. Panel B shows
the RD estimates for outcome aggregated at the individual level. In addition to the indicator for birth weight≥1,200
g, each regression includes a linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed effects, admission month fixed effects,
and hospital county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported. The means of logged outcomes are reported in
levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.5: Heterogeneity by driving time to the nearest hospital with a NICU, New York City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Below the median driving time
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.272∗∗∗ -0.136∗ -0.141 -0.109 0.041∗∗ 0.023
(0.030) (0.079) (0.108) (0.119) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 2321 1713 1700 1230 2321 1158
Mean below cutoff 0.043 53.4 $287,628 $107,557 0.069 0.031
Mean above cutoff 0.324 43.3 $246,442 $87,755 0.079 0.028
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel B. Above the median driving time
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.218∗∗∗ -0.083 -0.077 -0.128 0.019 0.023
(0.025) (0.072) (0.080) (0.087) (0.018) (0.024)
Observations 2648 1962 1959 1486 2648 1312
Mean below cutoff 0.026 51.1 $200,293 $84,847 0.066 0.044
Mean above cutoff 0.258 41.5 $167,791 $70,934 0.055 0.040
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: Panel A shows the RD estimates for hospitals whose driving time to the nearest hospital with a NICU is
below the median, while panel B shows the RD estimates whose driving time is above the median. In addition to
the indicator for birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression includes a linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed
effects, admission month fixed effects, and hospital county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported. The
means of logged outcomes are reported in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneity by NICU crowdedness, New York City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Below the median NICU occupancy
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.246∗∗∗ -0.055 -0.043 -0.029 0.007 0.030
(0.033) (0.081) (0.100) (0.103) (0.025) (0.029)
Observations 1442 1063 1058 808 1442 724
Mean below cutoff 0.019 52.3 $268,717 $104,320 0.063 0.035
Mean above cutoff 0.255 43.4 $244,479 $89,590 0.052 0.032
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel B. Above the median NICU occupancy
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.236∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.226∗∗ -0.234∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.028
(0.028) (0.075) (0.092) (0.099) (0.018) (0.028)
Observations 2040 1513 1509 1121 2040 1010
Mean below cutoff 0.019 52.8 $275,354 $103,933 0.050 0.046
Mean above cutoff 0.285 42.5 $223,628 $84,551 0.053 0.038
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: Panel A shows the RD estimates for months when the NICU occupancy is below the median for a given hospital
in a given year. Panel B shows the RD estimates for relatively more crowded months when the NICU occupancy is
above the median for a given hospital-year. In addition to the indicator for birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression
includes a linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed effects, admission month fixed effects, and hospital
county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported. The means of logged outcomes are reported in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneity by crowdedness at the nearest hospital with a NICU, New York City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Below the median NICU occupancy at the nearest hospital
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.232∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗ -0.227∗∗ -0.300∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.029
(0.030) (0.084) (0.104) (0.119) (0.021) (0.027)
Observations 1846 1379 1373 995 1846 938
Mean below cutoff 0.023 52.0 $275,300 $111,706 0.062 0.046
Mean above cutoff 0.271 43.3 $237,916 $90,772 0.062 0.032
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel B. Above the median NICU occupancy at the nearest hospital
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.286∗∗∗ -0.151∗ -0.099 -0.074 -0.019 0.022
(0.038) (0.079) (0.107) (0.114) (0.024) (0.037)
Observations 1284 932 928 668 1284 624
Mean below cutoff 0.024 54.0 $280,850 $108,544 0.074 0.034
Mean above cutoff 0.295 41.9 $225,560 $87,478 0.054 0.049
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: Panel A shows the RD estimates for months when the NICU occupancy at the nearest hospital with a NICU is
below the median, while panel B shows the RD estimates for months when the NICU occupancy at the nearest hospital
with a NICU is above the median. In addition to the indicator for birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression includes a
linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed effects, admission month fixed effects, and hospital county fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are reported. The means of logged outcomes are reported in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneity by predicted list prices, New York City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Below the median predicted list prices
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.231∗∗∗ -0.025 0.050 -0.095 0.016 -0.002
(0.029) (0.063) (0.085) (0.084) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 2226 1619 1619 1233 2226 1078
Mean below cutoff 0.034 47.9 $218,768 $86,188 0.054 0.019
Mean above cutoff 0.274 37.9 $174,036 $67,170 0.050 0.010
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel B. Above the median predicted list prices
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.227∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗ -0.174∗∗ -0.111 0.035∗ 0.038∗
(0.023) (0.070) (0.086) (0.092) (0.019) (0.022)
Observations 3202 2409 2393 1831 3202 1632
Mean below cutoff 0.031 54.1 $261,268 $98,819 0.076 0.048
Mean above cutoff 0.282 45.8 $237,610 $86,562 0.071 0.050
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: Panel A shows the RD estimates for infants whose predicted list charges are below the median, while panel B
shows the RD estimates for infants whose predicted list charges are above the median. In addition to the indicator for
birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression includes a linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed effects, admission
month fixed effects, and hospital county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported. The means of logged
outcomes are reported in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.9: Effects of birth weight≥1,200 grams on discharge outcomes, robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Hospitals in New Jersey and Maryland
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.030 0.018 0.032 0.071 0.001 0.008
(0.023) (0.081) (0.088) (0.095) (0.021) (0.015)
Observations 4755 3548 3542 3144 4755 2372
Mean below cutoff 0.206 43.0 $215,660 $58,100 0.151 0.031
Mean above cutoff 0.197 35.8 $177,229 $45,062 0.124 0.023
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel B. Infants born after April 2012
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.109 0.022 0.018 0.209 -0.029 0.026
(0.069) (0.180) (0.214) (0.230) (0.042) (0.048)
Observations 900 669 669 554 900 438
Mean below cutoff 0.437 53.5 $427,550 $134,895 0.101 0.056
Mean above cutoff 0.503 42.3 $330,527 $109,927 0.055 0.042
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: Panel A shows the RD estimates for each outcome at birth hospitals in New Jersey and Maryland from 2003-
2011. In addition to the indicator for birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression includes a linear spline of birth weight,
admission year fixed effects, admission month fixed effects, and state dummy for New Jersey. Panel B shows the RD
estimates for each outcome at birth hospitals for infants admitted after April 2012. Robust standard errors are reported.
The means of logged outcomes are reported in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.10: Difference-in-difference estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Without county-specific time trends
MMC mandate 0.111∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.022) (0.004) (0.037) (0.022) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 4173544 4169319 4168406 2311157 3448242 4173535
Mean 0.170 3.8 $7,132 $3,446 0.011 0.004
Panel B. With county-specific time trends
MMC mandate 0.065∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.106∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.001 0.000
(0.015) (0.003) (0.031) (0.025) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 4173544 4169319 4168406 2311157 3448242 4173535
Mean 0.170 3.8 $7,132 $3,446 0.011 0.004
Notes: Panel A presents a difference-in-difference estimate for each outcome without including the county-specific
trends. Panel B shows the estimates including the county-specific trends. The means of logged outcomes are reported
in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 1.11: Mean complier characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RD window [1050 g,1350 g] DD Full sample
Complier mean Overall mean Complier mean Overall mean
Panel A. Hospital characteristics
Total beds 756.8 750.4 634.7 581.5
NICU beds 20.5 20.3 14.4 13.5
Number of physicians 188.7 184.6 148.5 127.9
Number of nurses 1286.7 1295.9 1093.0 845.0
Total admissions 35181.4 35480.7 31757.9 25590.2
Total births 3872.6 4028.5 3716.6 3145.5
NICU 0.92 0.94 0.81 0.72
Teaching hospital 0.70 0.70 0.55 0.49
Indigent care 0.72 0.71 0.77 0.63
Lives covered, capitated (1995 values) 7008.3 7177.0 5782.7 7413.5
Share covered by Medicaid, infants 0.57 0.47 0.59 0.40
Share covered by Medicaid, all patients 0.37 0.31 0.35 0.26
Share covered by HMO, infants 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.24
Share covered by HMO, all patients 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20
Panel B. Patient characteristics
Birth weight (grams) 1305.5 1204.5 3263.3 3287.4
Fraction low birth weight (<2,500 grams) 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.08
Female 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.48
White 0.21 0.36 0.26 0.51
Black 0.37 0.31 0.20 0.17
Hispanic 0.22 0.15 0.29 0.15
Asian 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.06
Median income, quartile 1 0.56 0.36 0.53 0.30
Median income, quartile 2 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.22
Median income, quartile 3 0.17 0.19 0.12 0.21
Median income, quartile 4 0.09 0.25 0.15 0.28
Admission scheduled 0.61 0.64 0.86 0.78
Admission on the weekend 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.22
Observations 8848 4173544
Notes: Column 1 presents mean characteristics of compliers within the RD estimation window. Column 2 shows the
overall mean characteristics within the RD estimation window. Column 3 describes the complier mean for the DD
specification. Column 4 shows the full sample mean. Median income is measured at the patient zip code level. I follow
Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Almond and Doyle (2011) to compute complier characteristics. Refer to Appendix
Section B for further details.
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Chapter 2. Late-Career Job Loss and Retirement Behavior of Couples
2.1 Introduction
Evidence from different sources shows that couples coordinate the timing of retirement (Hurd
1990a; Blau 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier 2000; Michaud 2003; Gustman and Steinmeier 2004).
A number of studies examine the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of “joint retirement,”
with a focus on understanding how individuals near retirement age would behave in response to
changes in the social security system. Existing literature finds that complementarities in tastes for
leisure between spouses are important in explaining joint retirement.36 Leisure complementari-
ties exist when spouses enjoy retirement more when their partners are retired as well. However,
financial capability for supporting retirement is another crucial channel that affects the retirement
behavior of couples by changing households’ budget constraints. In addition, examining the role
of financial considerations would also provide insight into identifying the group of individuals who
rely heavily on the social security system.
While the literature on couples’ retirement accounts for the impact of complex financial incen-
tives that stem from the social security system and pensions, it does not specifically examine the
impact of unexpected shocks to earnings of individuals. This paper bridges this gap in the literature
by assessing the effect of displacement - job loss due to business closings or layoffs - on retire-
ment behavior of both spouses. There are two possible responses of spouses if their partners’ job
loss increases the probability of their retirement. To restore lost income, the spouse of a displaced
worker may stay in the labor force longer (i.e., delay retirement) compared to the spouse of a non-
displaced worker. On the contrary, the spouse might leave the labor force and retire early for the
36Given evidence of joint retirement, many studies have carefully modeled the environment in which couples jointly
make employment decisions (Gustman and Steinmeier 2000; Gustman and Steinmeier 2004; Maestas 2001; Michaud
2003; Michaud and Vermeulen 2004; Blau and Gilleskie 2006; Van der Klaauw and Wolpin 2008; Casanova 2010).
These studies focus on leisure complementarities between spouses as the key mechanism underlying joint retirement.
Studies with reduced-form approaches also reach a similar conclusion showing that financial incentives alone cannot
fully explain joint retirement decisions (Coile 2004; Banks et al. 2010).
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sake of leisure complementarities. I test which of the two hypotheses dominates using the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS). The retirement decision of the spouses of displaced workers can be
different depending on the displaced workers’ retirement status. For instance, the negative earnings
shock to the household will be relatively modest if the displaced worker finds employment instead
of choosing to retire. Therefore, I focus on how spouses respond only when their partners retire
following job displacement.
This paper is related to the literature on the impact of job displacement. Displacement leads
to long-term earnings losses, lower wealth holdings, lower employment rates, higher mortality,
and decreased health insurance coverage (Ruhm 1991; Olson 1992; Jacobson et al. 1993; Chan
and Stevens 1999; Chan and Stevens 2001; Munnell et al. 2006; Sullivan and Von Wachter 2009;
Stevens and Moulton 2013). Moreover, Chan and Stevens (2004) find that job displacement in-
creases the probability of retiring. Recent studies by Coile and Levine (2007, 2011) focus on the
impact of recessions on older workers’ retirement decisions and find that the probability of retire-




I use nine waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1994 to 2010. The HRS is
a longitudinal panel data set that surveys a representative sample of individuals over the age of 50
and their spouses every two years. The HRS is ideal for studying retirement in a household context
for at least three reasons. First, it surveys the relevant age group, 50 and older. Second, it tracks
both spouses over time, a feature that is missing in most administrative data sets. Third, it contains




I construct a sample that consists of full time workers who were between 50 and 70 years of
age and were married when they first appeared in the survey. In total, there are 22,002 person-year
observations. In terms of couples, there are 11,001 couple-year observations from 2,165 unique
heterosexual couples, where both spouses meet the sample restriction. Using this sample of older
working couples, I define the treatment (displaced) and the control (non-displaced) groups.
2.2.3 Definition of Job Loss
For the treatment group, I exploit extensive information on employment to identify individuals
who have lost their jobs. Respondents are asked whether they are working at the same job as in
the previous wave (i.e., two years ago). If they are no longer at the job, they are asked why they
left the previous employer. I define displaced workers as those who stopped working because of
business closings or layoffs. This is consistent with the definition commonly used in the literature
on job loss (for example, see Chan and Stevens (1999, 2001)). These reasons are less likely to be
correlated with worker characteristics that might affect retirement decisions.
Other reasons for job loss in the survey are poor health/disabled, family care, better job, quit,
and retired. I exclude those who lost a job due to poor health/disabled as it is not the focus of the
current study although it is an involuntary reason for job loss.37 If an individual left employment
voluntarily (i.e., due to family care, better job, or quit), I classify him as non-displaced. Hence,
workers who stopped working for voluntary reasons form the control group in addition to employed
workers.38 Based on these rules, I construct a time-varying binary indicator for individuals who
37While retirement likely implies joint leisure for spouses whose partners retire after losing a job due to layoffs or
plant closings, it might imply looking after the sick partners for spouses whose partners retire following a job loss due
to poor health or disability. Thus, the spousal response can be different depending on the specific reason for job loss.
That said, including job loss due to poor healthy/disabled as a source of job displacement in addition to layoffs and
plant closings does not change the results.
38When I drop couples where either spouse stopped working due to voluntary reasons, I lose 2,739 couple-year
observations. Excluding these couples does not affect the results; these results are available upon request. I am unable
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reported job loss because of business closings or layoffs since the last interview. In the sample,
the incidence of job loss due to business closings or layoffs during the sample period is around 5%
(1,143 out of 22,002).
Figure 2.1 presents the average displacement rates from 1994 to 2010. The solid line indicates
my preferred measure of job loss that includes both business closings and layoffs. To address that
job loss may be endogenous, I use job loss due to business closings only as another measure of
displacement. The dashed line shows the trend in average displacement rates using this measure.
Both schedules evolve in a similar pattern over time. Since I restrict my sample to those working
full time in 1994, job loss rates are the lowest in 1994 relative to the years that follow. There are
discernible increases in job loss in 2002 and 2010, consistent with the recessions in early 2000s
and in 2008-2009.
2.2.4 Definition of Retirement
I define retirement using self-reported current employment status. A person is retired if he is
not working, not looking for a job, not temporarily laid off, not disabled, and not a homemaker. I
allow for temporary retirement (i.e., a person can retire in one period and be working next period)
because retirement is frequently not a complete exit from the labor force for many individuals.
I check whether the results are robust to another measure of retirement, which indicates whether
the individual considers herself completely retired. This measure additionally captures individuals’
intentions to rejoin the labor force even when they are currently retired. The results are not sensitive
to this different measure of retirement.
to conduct the analysis using those who lost a job due to voluntary reasons as the sole control group (i.e., excluding




One of the most important determinants of retirement is financial incentives. The HRS con-
tains information on pension coverage, income, and assets. In addition, I use information on
self-reported health, age, health insurance, and other time-varying factors in the main estimation
with individual fixed effects. Table 2.1 shows means of selected variables in 1994 separately by
whether an individual is ever displaced (columns (1) and (2)) as well as by whether the individual’s
spouse is ever displaced (columns (4) and (5)). For instance, the first row in panel A summarizes
average age for husbands who have ever been displaced in column (1); average age for husbands
who have never been displaced in column (2); the difference between these two groups in column
(3); average age for husbands whose wives have ever been displaced in column (4); average age
for husbands whose wives have never been displaced in column (5); and the difference between the
last two groups in column (6). Panel B reports the same set of summary statistics for wives. Esti-
mates are all weighted using survey weights to account for the oversampling of blacks, Hispanics,
and Florida residents. All monetary measures are in 2006 real values adjusted by CPI-U.
Columns (1)-(3) show that husbands who have ever been displaced were slightly older, less
likely to have health insurance, and less likely to participate in pension programs than never-
displaced workers. The annual earnings gap between the two groups is sizable, approximately
$14,600 in 2006 dollars. Moreover, never-displaced workers had more financial wealth and more
money in their Individual Retirement Account than ever-displaced workers. Ever-displaced wives
display similar disadvantages compared to never-displaced wives. Columns (4)-(6) present a sim-
ilar pattern in summary statistics by spousal displacement status.
2.2.6 Empirical Strategy
I first estimate the effect of job displacement on an individual’s own retirement. Table 2.1 sug-
gests that job displacement is not randomly assigned. To control for these differences in observable
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characteristics, I control for individual fixed effects (αi) and time-varying characteristics (Xit) in
the estimations described below.
Rit = βDit + δ′Xit + αi + µt + eit (6)
Rit is an indicator for retirement status of person i in year t.39 The impact of job loss on the indi-
vidual’s probability of retirement is captured by β, the coefficient on the indicator for job loss, Dit .
Dit takes the value one if the individual i reports a job loss in year t. Xit includes time-varying co-
variates: age, age squared,40 self-reported health, an indicator for having health insurance, lagged
earnings, lagged financial and IRA wealth, and lagged indicators for defined benefit plan and de-
fined contribution plan. I use lagged variables to take into account that these measures could have
been affected by their current job status. For example, those who reported a job loss between the
surveys might have depleted their wealth. The pension measures are also lagged because they tend
to be tied to the individuals’ current employment status. The results are not sensitive to excluding
time-varying covariates. αi is an individual fixed effect, which accounts for time-invariant charac-
teristics of individuals. µt is a year effect that captures the general time pattern of retirement in the
economy. I estimate the equation as a linear probability model separately for husbands and wives.41
Standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the individual level to take into account serial
correlation of retirement.
Then, I estimate the following equation:
Rit = β1Dit + β2SRit + β3SDit + β4SRit ∗ SDit + δ′Xit + αi + µt + eit (7)
39Year t indicates the year of the interview. Respondents are asked in year t whether they have lost a job or have
retired since the last wave in year t−2. Thus, the retirement and job loss variables in year t include those that happened
in the past two years.
40Using dummies for each age instead of a quadratic function of age does not change the results.
41Fixed effects estimators of nonlinear models (e.g., logit or probit) can be severely biased due to the incidental
parameters problem. See, for example, Lancaster (2000).
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SRit is a binary indicator if the spouse is retired in year t, and SDit is an indicator that takes one
if the spouse is displaced in year t. Thus, SRit ∗ SDit would take one if the spouse was displaced
and retired in year t. β4 captures the impact on an individual’s probability of retirement when his
partner retires following a job displacement.
To identify the main coefficient of interest β4 in equation (2), both individual displacement and
spousal displacement should be exogenous to individual retirement decisions. However, job loss
may be endogenous as some unobservable characteristics of displaced workers can be correlated
with a tendency to retire. For example, those who value leisure highly might shirk at work and
also prefer to retire early. It is impossible to test this assumption, but I tackle this issue in two
ways. First, I repeat the estimation using business closings as the only measure of individual and
spousal displacement, as this measure is plausibly more exogenous. Second, displacement due
to economy-wide shocks (e.g., recessions) is likely to be exogenous to worker characteristics. I
examine the subgroup of workers who reported job loss in the 2002 and 2010 surveys, which cover
the periods that correspond to recessions in early 2000s and 2008-2009.
Another challenge in estimating equation (2) is that spousal retirement is endogenous to their
partners’ own retirement. For example, husbands who retire following a job loss might do so only
because they know that their wives have substantial earnings ability and thus will naturally stay
in the labor force longer. To deal with this issue, I exploit the earliest age at which a person can
claim Social Security benefits, which is 62 in the US. Social Security benefits that are available
at age 62 are reduced when claimed before the full retirement age, and are increased by delayed
retirement credits when received after the full retirement age, up to age 70. Social security benefits
are designed to replace part of the employment earnings; the replacement rate ranged from 26%
to 56% in 2013 depending on the worker’s prior earnings level. The literature documents that
financial incentives from Social Security benefits play an important role in determining the timing
of retirement (Hurd 1990b; Anderson et al. 1999).
Specifically, I use an indicator for spousal age 62 and older, Ait = I (spousal age ≥ 62), as an
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instrument for spousal retirement, SRit . Analogously, I use Ait ∗SDit as an instrument for the inter-
action term, SRit ∗SDit . This instrument is valid if the husband’s incentive to retire at age 62 affects
his wife’s retirement decisions only because it increases the likelihood of his own retirement. Thus,
the identification assumption is that the early entitlement age is an exogenous institutional feature
that is not correlated with couples’ characteristics. If a husband retires after reaching the age of 62
solely due to incentives created by the social security system, his retirement is exogenous to his
wife’s retirement decision. While it is not possible to test this exclusion restriction, I examine the
distribution of age at retirement in my sample. Figure 2.2 shows disproportionately high number
of people retiring at age 62 (the early entitlement age) and another modest spike at age 65 (the
normal retirement age). This suggests that a substantial proportion of people are induced to time
their retirement at the early entitlement age determined by the social security system. A number of
papers use social security incentives as an instrument for retirement (Bound and Waidmann 2007;
Banks et al. 2010; Rohwedder and Willis 2010; Mazzonna and Peracchi 2012).
2.3 Results
Based on the empirical strategy presented above, I estimate the effect of job displacement and
retirement on couples both by OLS and 2SLS. Thereafter, I present the results of the event study
approach and the heterogeneity analysis.
2.3.1 Main Results
Table 2.2 reports the results of OLS estimations separately for husbands (columns (1)-(4)) and
wives (columns (5)-(8)). Columns (1) and (5) show the effect of individuals’ job loss on their
own retirement probability. Job loss significantly increases the probability of retirement for both
husbands and wives.
Column (2) shows that wives’ job displacement does not have a direct impact on their hus-
bands’ retirement. Column (6) shows that the effect of husbands’ job displacement on wives’
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retirement is negative but not significant. The impact of spousal retirement is positive and signifi-
cant, indicating a tendency of joint retirement as shown in columns (3) and (7). This suggests that
couples value spending leisure together, and thus coordinate the timing of retirement. Moreover,
notice that the coefficient is larger in magnitude for husbands than for wives. This is consistent
with the literature that finds that husbands are more responsive to wives’ retirement incentives than
wives are (see, for example, Coile (2004)).
Columns (4) and (8) show how individuals’ retirement decisions are affected by spousal job
displacement and retirement status. The coefficient on the interaction term, spouse displaced and
retired, is negative but insignificant for husbands. However, it is negative and significant for wives.
That is, wives are 12 percentage points less likely to retire when their husbands retire following a
job loss, and the magnitude is large enough to offset the increased probability of retirement due to
their own job loss. This effect is more than half the mean (20.7%) and statistically significant at
the 0.01 level. This is evidence that wives delay retirement when their husbands retire after losing
a job. I interpret this as indicating that an unexpected job loss inducing displaced workers to leave
the labor force involuntarily, and their spouses delaying retirement for financial support in response
to that.
I repeat the estimation of equation (2) using instrumental variables to address the endogene-
ity of spousal retirement. Table 2.3 summarizes the first-stage regressions. Since there are two
endogenous variables (SRit and SRit ∗ SDit), there are two first-stage regressions:
SRit =β1Dit + β2Ait + β3SDit + β4Ait ∗ SDit + δ′Xit + αi + µt + eit (8)
SRit ∗ SDit =β1Dit + β2Ait + β3SDit + β4Ait ∗ SDit + δ′Xit + αi + µt + eit (9)
Columns (1) and (2) show the regression results of equations (3) and (4) for husbands. Sim-
ilarly, column (3) and (4) show the estimates of equations (3) and (4) for wives. First-stage F-
statistics reported in the last row confirm that age 62 is a strong predictor of retirement.
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Table 2.4 shows the results of the 2SLS regressions. The coefficients on the instrumented
spousal retirement are positive and significant for both husbands and wives. Moreover, wives
are less likely to retire in response to their displaced husbands’ retirement, and the magnitude is
larger than that from the OLS regression in column (8) of Table 2.2. The difference may reflect
different populations captured by 2SLS and OLS. For instance, those who retire in accordance
with Social Security (i.e., compliers) may be more credit-constrained, which can explain the larger
2SLS estimates. These results suggest that wives’ retirement delay is not driven by their husbands’
endogenous retirement.
In additional analyses, I use a more exogenous measure of displacement, which considers
business closings as the only valid reason for job displacement (i.e., excluding layoffs). Wives
tend to delay retirement in response to their husbands’ job loss and retirement (OLS coefficient:
-0.064 (0.061); 2SLS coefficient: -0.183 (0.120)). Although the estimates are not as precise due
to low incidence of business closings (1.6%), this suggests that the results are not solely driven
by those who were laid off. I also repeat the main estimations for the subgroup of workers who
experienced a job loss during recessions in 2000-2001 or in 2008-2009, since displacement due to
economy-wide shocks is likely to be exogenous to worker characteristics. Wives are 29 percentage
points less likely to retire (OLS coefficient: -0.289 (0.371)), which is comparable to the 2SLS
estimate from my preferred specification (from column (2) of Table 2.4: -0.271 (0.089)).
Moreover, I examine another measure of retirement, which indicates whether individuals con-
sider themselves completely retired. OLS regressions suggest that both husbands and wives tend
to delay retirement (husbands: -0.129 (0.058); wives: -0.142 (0.039)). 2SLS regressions indicate
that the estimate for husbands is of the same magnitude but insignificant (-0.164 (0.123)) while the
magnitude of the estimate for wives is larger and significant (-0.333 (0.113)).
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2.3.2 Event Study Approach
To investigate how persistent the impacts of individuals’ job loss and retirement are on their
spouses’ retirement, I employ an event study approach. An event study also serves as a way to
test causal interpretations of the main results. For example, showing that a pre-trend in the retire-
ment probability is not correlated with a future job displacement, while the likelihood of retirement
changes sharply at the time of displacement, would support the notion that job displacement trig-
gered the response in retirement decisions. This is a common approach taken in the literature in
the analysis of job displacement (Jacobson et al., 1993). Specifically, I estimate the following
equation:
Rit = β1Dit + β2Ait + β3SDit +
10∑
−10
β4k (SRSD)kit + δ Xit + αi + µt + eit (10)
The dummy variables, (SRSD)kit (k=-10, -8, . . . , 0, . . . , 8, 10) indicate k years before and
after spousal retirement following job displacement (hereafter, the event). Since I observe up to
16 years before and after the event, (SRSD)−10it takes one for 10 to 16 years before the event and
zero otherwise. (SRSD)10it is analogously defined for 10 to 16 years after the event. The omitted
time period is 2 years before the event. Hence, the coefficients β4k measure the change in the
probability of retirement not only at the time of the event but also k years before and after, relative
to the time period just before the event. I estimate this both by OLS and by 2SLS, instrumenting
the spousal retirement variables with an indicator for spousal age greater than or equal to 62.
Figure 2.3 shows the dynamics of individuals’ retirement probability after their spouses retire
following a job loss. Panels (a) and (b) show the results of OLS regressions for husbands and wives,
respectively. For panels (c) and (d), I use an indicator for spousal displacement after reaching 62
as an instrument for spousal retirement following displacement. Consistent with Tables 2.2 and
2.3, husbands do not immediately respond to their wives’ retirement following a job loss, whereas
wives do. Interestingly, husbands do seem to delay retirement four years later, which suggests that
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the earnings shock following their displaced wives’ retirement might not take effect until a few
years later.
Panel (d) is particularly informative - it presents a sharp drop in wives’ probability of retirement
when their husbands report a job loss and retire, and this increases steadily over time. The decline
in the probability of retirement does not persist and is not statistically different from zero four years
after spousal retirement following a job loss. This provides additional evidence that wives may be
staying in the labor force to compensate for their husbands’ involuntary retirement induced by job
displacement.
An unexpected shock to one individual’s wage income can have a significant impact on the re-
tirement behavior of both spouses. Interestingly, however, only wives delay retirement in response
to their husbands’ job loss and retirement. This poses multiple hypotheses about the possible un-
derlying mechanisms. Is a husband’s job loss more critical to household finance than a wife’s job
loss, as husbands are more likely to be the primary earners? Do wives have a better chance of stay-
ing in the labor force, as they are generally younger? Or do wives who are younger than husbands
need to spend a few more years working before being able to claim Social Security benefits? I
investigate these hypotheses in the following section.
2.3.3 Heterogeneity Analysis
I examine heterogeneous effects by subgroups to disentangle potential mechanisms of the main
effects. I repeat the main 2SLS estimations for different subgroups; Table 2.5 reports the coeffi-
cients on the interaction between spousal displacement and spousal retirement.
I consider individual age below or above 62 to test whether the effects vary depending on
whether the spouse of the displaced worker is eligible for Social Security benefits. As shown in
columns (2) and (3) of panel B, the delay of retirement is mostly driven by wives younger than 62
and thus not yet eligible for Social Security benefits. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a
financial mechanism is at play. I also examine the effects by the level of total financial and IRA
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wealth to test the hypothesis that people who have secure retirement wealth would not necessarily
respond to their partners’ job loss and retirement. In columns (4)-(6) I divide the sample into three
groups based on the sum of total financial and IRA wealth.42 I find that the wives’ response is the
largest when couples were in the lowest quartile of the wealth distribution. This suggests that wives
in the relatively poor household are most likely to delay retirement in response to their husbands’
retirement following a job loss.
Finally, I examine whether the effects are heterogeneous depending on who assumes the role of
the primary earner in the household. I define the primary earner as the spouse who contributes more
than half of the total household earnings in the period preceding the job loss. Column (7) shows
a significant drop in wives’ probability of retiring when their husbands are the primary earners. If
husbands who were primary earners lost a job and subsequently retired, it could cause a substantial
loss in household income. This could have led their wives (i.e., the secondary earners) to delay
retirement to compensate for their husbands’ job loss. This might explain why I do not find any
effect on the husbands’ retirement decision when their wives lose a job and retire. As wives are
likely to earn less than husbands in general (64% of the case in my sample), losing wives’ income
might not be as substantial a loss to the household.
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
While the existing literature focuses on complementarities in tastes for leisure between spouses
in examining retirement behavior couples, I examine the role of an unexpected earnings shock: a
late-career job loss. I find that wives delay retirement when their husbands retire following a job
loss, instead of seeking other employment. The decline in wives’ probability of retiring persists
for at least a couple of years following their husbands’ job loss. Wives’ job loss, however, does
42Financial wealth is calculated as the sum of dollar values of stock, bonds, and savings. The HRS also asks
whether the couple has any money or assets held in an Individual Retirement Account (i.e., in an IRA or KEOGH
account), and how much is in their accounts. The 25th percentile wealth was $10,000 and the 75th percentile wealth
was $175,000 in 2006 dollars. The mean wealth was $184,700 in 2006 dollars.
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not have a statistically significant impact on their husbands’ retirement decision, though the point
estimates are negative.
This evidence suggests that uncertainty in household income has a significant impact on how
couples time their retirement. In addition, it shows how married men are privately insured by their
wives, mitigating the impact of an unexpected earnings shock. However, selection into retirement
is not random, which makes it difficult to interpret the effect of husbands’ retirement on that of
wives as causal. To address this issue, I use the early entitlement age for Social Security benefits,
which is 62 in the US, as an instrument for retirement. I find that two stage least squares (2SLS)
regressions yield the same conclusions.
Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the results appear stronger for subgroups that are relatively
more credit-constrained. The drop in the probability of retirement is pronounced when couples
are in the lowest quartile of the wealth distribution. In addition, I find that wives tend to delay
retirement more when their husbands were the primary earners in the household. This is consistent
with a story where the secondary earner tends to delay retirement to compensate for the primary
earner’s job loss. Moreover, I find that wives younger than 62 are much more likely to delay
retirement in response to their partners’ retirement following a job loss relative to wives older
than 62, implying that Social Security benefits can help relax the household budget constraint and
allows wives to join their husbands in retirement.
For future research, it would be useful to investigate how ever-married or single individuals
cope with an unexpected job loss. For instance, single individuals might need to seek a different
source of insurance following an unexpected earnings shock, due to a lack of within-household
insurance. In addition, exploring policy tools that can help correct this potential discrepancy stem-
ming from different family structures or marital status would be an important agenda for future
research. For example, tagging current marital status besides just age when designing the social
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Figure 2.1: Incidence of Displacement over the Sample Period
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Figure 2.2: Retirement Hazard Rate
Source: Author’s tabulations from the 1994-2010 Health and Retirement Study.
Notes: The figure reports the density of age at retirement in the sample. I define retirement using self-reported current
employment status. Specifically, a person is retired if he is not working, not looking for a job, not temporarily laid off,
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Years from spousal retirement following displacement
(d) Wives (instrumented)
Figure 2.3: Probability of Retirement by Years from the Displaced Spousal Retirement
Source: Author’s tabulations from the 1994-2010 Health and Retirement Study.
Notes: Each figure plots point estimates from a regression of retirement status on a set of dummies that indicate years
from spousal retirement after displacement. Individual fixed effects, year effects, and time-varying controls (age, age
squared, self-reported health, an indicator for having health insurance, lagged earnings, lagged financial and IRA
wealth, lagged indicators for defined benefit plan, and defined contribution plan) are also included in the regressions.
The dashed lines plot 95-percent confidence intervals computed based on standard errors clustered at the individual
level. The omitted time period is 2 years before the spousal post-displacement retirement. Panels (a) and (b) show
results from OLS regressions. Panels (c) and (d) present 2SLS regressions using an indicator for spousal age greater
than or equal to 62 to instrument for spousal retirement variables.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Never Difference Spouse ever Spouse never Difference
displaced displaced (1)-(2) displaced displaced (4)-(5)
Panel A. Husbands
Age 61.79 61.43 0.36∗∗ 61.84 61.43 0.41∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16)
Education 13.45 13.39 0.06 13.31 13.43 -0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
White 0.92 0.91 0.01∗∗ 0.92 0.91 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Have health insurance 0.80 0.82 -0.02∗∗ 0.78 0.83 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Have pension 0.30 0.39 -0.09∗∗∗ 0.35 0.37 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Earnings $35,200 $49,800 -$14,600∗∗∗ $42,400 $47,200 -$4,800∗
(1,500) (2,500)
Financial wealth $82,600 $108,700 -$26,100∗∗∗ $78,600 $108,500 -$29,900∗∗∗
(7,400) (7,300)
IRA wealth $75,600 $98,500 -$22,900∗∗∗ $71,800 $98,500 -$26,700∗∗∗
(7,900) (7,800)
Observations 2742 8259 11001 2446 8555 11001
Panel B. Wives
Age 59.49 58.96 0.53∗∗∗ 59.53 58.92 0.61∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.14)
Education 13.23 13.43 -0.20∗∗∗ 13.38 13.39 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
White 0.93 0.91 0.01∗∗∗ 0.92 0.91 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Have health insurance 0.83 0.87 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.86 0.86 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Have pension 0.31 0.44 -0.13∗∗∗ 0.42 0.41 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Earnings $23,800 $31,800 -$8,000∗∗∗ $27,300 $31,100 -$3,800∗∗∗
(1,100) (1,000)
Financial wealth $78,600 $108,500 -$29,900∗∗∗ $82,600 $108,700 -$26,100∗∗∗
(7,300) (7,400)
IRA wealth $71,800 $98,500 -$26,700∗∗∗ $75,600 $98,500 -$22,900∗∗∗
(7,800) (7,900)
Observations 2446 8555 11001 2742 8259 11001
Source: Author’s calculations from the 1994-2010 Health and Retirement Study.
Notes: All estimates are weighted with survey weights. All monetary variables are inflation-adjusted using 2006 CPI-
U. Financial wealth is defined as the sum of dollar values of stock, bonds, and savings. Note that financial wealth and
IRA wealth are measured at the household level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
70
Table 2.2: Effects of job loss on each spouse’s retirement decision: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Husbands Wives
Displaced 0.143∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Spouse displaced 0.006 -0.002 -0.021 -0.006
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017)
Spouse retired 0.203∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Spouse displaced and retired -0.029 -0.122∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.038)
Observations 11001 11001 11001 11001 11001 11001 11001 11001
Mean retirement rate 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207
Source: Author’s estimations from the 1994-2010 Health and Retirement Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. ∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at
5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. All estimates are weighted with survey weights. Each regression contains individual fixed
effects, year effects, and time-varying covariates (age, age squared, self-reported health, an indicator for having health
insurance, lagged earnings, lagged financial and IRA wealth, lagged indicators for defined benefit plan, and defined
contribution plan).
Table 2.3: Effects of job loss on each spouse’s retirement decision: First-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Husbands Wives
Dependent variable: Spouse retired Spouse displaced Spouse retired Spouse displaced
& retired & retired
Displaced -0.026 -0.004 -0.002 0.010
(0.016) (0.005) (0.020) (0.010)
Spouse displaced 0.039∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031)
Spousal age≥62 0.110∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004)
Spouse displaced and spousal age≥62 0.127∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.054) (0.041) (0.047)
Observations 11001 11001 11001 11001
Mean of dependent variable 0.207 0.011 0.265 0.019
F-statistic on the excluded instruments 30.8 41.4 28.3 55.6
Source: Author’s estimations from the 1994-2010 Health and Retirement Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. ∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at
5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. All estimates are weighted with survey weights. Each regression includes individual fixed
effects, year effects, and time-varying covariates (age, age squared, self-reported health, an indicator for having health
insurance, lagged earnings, lagged financial and IRA wealth, lagged indicators for defined benefit plan, and defined
contribution plan).
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Table 2.4: Effects of job loss on each spouse’s retirement decision: 2SLS estimates
(1) (2)
Husbands Wives
2SLS using spousal age
Displaced 0.151∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018)
Spouse displaced -0.005 0.016
(0.028) (0.027)
Spouse retired 0.312∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.126)
Spouse displaced and retired -0.050 -0.271∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.089)
Observations 11001 11001
Mean retirement rate 0.265 0.207
Source: Author’s estimations from the 1994-2010 Health and Retirement Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. ∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at
5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. All estimates are weighted with survey weights. Each regression includes individual fixed
effects, year effects, and time-varying covariates (age, age squared, self-reported health, an indicator for having health
insurance, lagged earnings, lagged financial and IRA wealth, lagged indicators for defined benefit plan, and defined
contribution plan). I use an indicator for spousal age greater than or equal to 62 as an instrument for spousal retirement
and the interaction between the indicator and spousal displacement as an instrument for spousal retirement interacted
with spousal displacement.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneous effects on retirement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample Age Wealth (percentile) Primary earner
<62 ≥62 <25th 25-75th ≥75th Husband Wife
Panel A. Husbands
Spouse displaced and retired -0.050 -0.259 0.036 0.045 -0.174 0.080 -0.159 0.078
(0.108) (0.400) (0.233) (0.229) (0.147) (0.308) (0.173) (0.380)
Observations 11001 4682 5794 2355 5335 2601 4045 2075
Mean retirement rate 0.265 0.066 0.428 0.232 0.246 0.333 0.173 0.385
Panel B. Wives
Spouse displaced and retired -0.271∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗ 0.583 -0.408∗∗∗ -0.141 -0.365 -0.377∗∗ -0.093
(0.089) (0.106) (1.259) (0.148) (0.133) (0.257) (0.190) (0.210)
Observations 11001 6657 3868 2355 5335 2601 4045 2075
Mean retirement rate 0.207 0.064 0.441 0.153 0.194 0.284 0.206 0.163
Source: Author’s estimations from the 1994-2010 Health and Retirement Study.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. ∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at
5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. All estimates are weighted with survey weights. Each regression contains individual fixed
effects, year effects, and time-varying covariates (age, age squared, self-reported health, an indicator for having health
insurance, lagged earnings, lagged financial and IRA wealth, lagged indicators for defined benefit plan, and defined
contribution plan). Spousal retirement variables are instrumented with spousal age greater than or equal to 62. Wealth
is defined as the sum of total financial and IRA wealth. The 25th percentile wealth was $10,000 and the 75th percentile
wealth was $175,000 in 2006 dollars. The primary earner of the household indicates the spouse who contributes more
than half of the total household earnings in the period preceding the job loss.
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Chapter 3. Retention Heterogeneity in New York City Schools
(with Douglas Almond and Amy Ellen Schwartz)
3.1 Introduction
US school districts increasingly rely on standardized tests to evaluate teachers and students.
Performance on “high stakes” tests can be a key determinant of whether students are retained
or “held back” in their grade. Well-identified studies have found retention can be beneficial for
short-term subsequent academic performance but possibly detrimental to longer-term outcomes
that might be of greater importance (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004, 2009). Reliance on such tests is
controversial in the US. For example, New York State is grappling with a sharply increased opt-
out rate in spring 2015 by students who declined to sit for the statewide proficiency exam (New
York Times, 2015).
We depart from previous literature by considering heterogeneity in how performance on stan-
dardized tests maps into consequences for students. Despite benchmarking from a common test
and cutoff score, substantial scope for discretion exists in how exam results are utilized. Failing
the exam can merely “start a conversation” about retention, where more often than not the student
is promoted to the next grade. The lack of deterministic link between exam performance and re-
tention opens the door to other factors shaping the retention decision. At present, we have little
sense of how non-test factors shape retention among students who scored the same.
We focus on New York City public schools where roughly 5,500 students are retained each
year. We analyze longitudinal data on 250,000 New York City public school students scoring near
the failure threshold. Passing the annual proficiency exam essentially guarantees promotion to
grades 4-9, while roughly 13% of those students failing the exam are retained. Compliers in our
application are those who are retained because they failed the proficiency exam. Because there is
a large population of never takers (promoted despite exam failure), the compliant sub-population
may differ from not only the overall New York City student population (obvious), but also from
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the sub-population located near the threshold (less obvious). We analyze retention and average
complier characteristics (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) using regression discontinuity methods.
We document pronounced heterogeneity in compliance along observable characteristics of the
student. Moreover, this heterogeneity departs in important ways from what we had expected a pri-
ori.43 In particular, we expected compliance to be highest among the youngest students, who were
closest to the age-at-school entry cutoff. These students narrowly missed beginning kindergarten a
year later and are on average less developed academically, socially, and physically than peers (par-
ticularly in early grades). Using administrative data on birth month, however, we do not find that
retained students tend to be young for their grade. Nor do we find older students are more likely to
be promoted after failure. Instead, we find race and gender to be important. Hispanic students are
60% more likely and Black students 120% more likely to be retained due to exam failure (relative
to White students). Female students are 25% more likely to be retained in their grade due to exam
failure than boys.44 Poverty (free or reduced-price lunch eligibility45) and poor performance on
previous exams also increase the likelihood of retention. Like age for grade, biometric measures of
student height and weight do not seem to play a large role beyond the exam score. Again, we had
expected smaller-stature students might face a higher retention risk when they fail because they
might “fit in” physically in their repeated grade. We also show these biometric and demographic
characteristics are smooth at the threshold. Thus it is not the case that, for example, Black students
have discontinuously worse characteristics just below the threshold for passing. Nor do we find
any evidence of heaping near the threshold.
We discuss two classes of “explanations” for the retention heterogeneity we uncover: student-
level differences and school-level differences. Regarding the former, it is not the case that the
predictive power of the baseline test score is different for girls or minorities than for the rest of
43See Tomchin and Impara (1992) for a description of factors affecting the probability of retention.
44Significant at the 1% level: see Section 3.5 and footnote 46.
45Students are eligible for free lunch if their parents or guardians make less than 130% of the poverty line and
reduced lunch if their parents/guardians make less than 185% of the poverty line.
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the student population (located near the failure threshold). Thus, we do not see evidence that, for
example, girls are more likely to be retained when they fail because failure is a stronger predictor of
future (poor) performance. On average, girls perform better in subsequent periods than boys with
identical baseline scores. Other factors equal, this would suggest that the compliance rate among
girls should be lower than for boys. Higher compliance of girls’ retention with exam failure is
puzzling. The unexplained gender gap is widest among Whites: failing increases a girl’s retention
rate to 5.9%, but when a White boy fails, only 0.9% are retained. Indeed, we cannot reject that
exam failure has zero impact on retention for non-Hispanic White boys.
Turning to school-level characteristics, these are “balanced” by sex so disproportionate reten-
tion of girls who fail cannot be attributed to differential exposure to school characteristics. Race
and ethnicity, in contrast, do vary with school-level characteristics. Among these school-level
factors, “high retention” schools have more minority students on average. Furthermore, predomi-
nantly Black schools tend to be high compliance schools, i.e. schools where retention rates jump
more below the failure threshold. While school-level factors thus appear important to racial het-
erogeneity in retention, so too do within-school factors. Blacks are substantially more likely to be
retained than Whites (for identical baseline scores) at predominantly non-Black schools.
The existing literature has overlooked compliance heterogeneity: we know of no published
work on the subject.46 In addition to student composition of schools, we also consider faculty
(Dee, 2005). The final retention decision is made by the school principal. We find a striking
pattern whereby girls are substantially more likely to be retained due to exam failure at schools with
a female principal. That said, because other (unobserved) characteristics of the school presumably
vary by principal’s characteristics (cf. student gender), we characterize this pattern as descriptive.
Furthermore, because girls perform better on average than boys, the unconditional retention rates
remain lower for girls than boys: girls score better on average and fewer girls fail (overall). This
and the fact that relatively few students are retained in a given school each year may have obscured
46Two recent working papers using Florida records are discussed in Section 3.2.1.
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higher retention rates among girls who just fail.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Literature Review
Previous papers have used regression discontinuity approaches to consider impacts of reten-
tion on subsequent outcomes, beginning with Jacob and Lefgren (2004). Among third graders in
Chicago public schools, Jacob and Lefgren (2004) found positive effects of retention and more
mixed impacts among sixth graders. Jacob and Lefgren (2009) found that retention increased sub-
sequent high school dropout rates. These findings are noteworthy as longer-term endpoints (like
high school completion) might be more important endpoints for parents, students, and policy mak-
ers than shorter-term achievement. Because compliance rates are an order of magnitude higher in
Chicago than in New York,47 there is a different scope for heterogeneity in compliance in Chicago’s
context compared to New York.
Mariano and Martorell (2013) follow Jacob and Lefgren (2004, 2009) and exploit test score
cutoffs used in assignment to summer school and retention in New York City. Specifically, they
consider 2004-2008 data on fifth graders failing proficiency exam in 2004-2006. They find modest
positive effects of summer school on English achievement. They estimate cohort-over-cohort test
score differences (“external drift”) and subtract it from the RD estimates of retention (see 3.5.5
section). They find large and positive effects of grade retention on both Math and English. As in
Jacob and Lefgren (2004, 2009), heterogeneity in compliance is not considered.
Student characteristics, however, might conceivably play a role by shaping interactions between
teachers and students. Dee (2005) uses National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88)
to examine the role of demographic similarity between teachers and students on teachers’ percep-
tions of students. Dee (2005) makes within-student comparisons of teachers’ perceptions, taking
4741% of sixth-graders who failed to meet the promotion cutoff were retained in Chicago from 1993-1994 to 1998-
1999 (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004).
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advantage of the structure of NELS:88 data, which surveyed teachers in two different academic
subjects, on their perceptions of individual students. Dee (2005) finds that teachers are more likely
to have negative perceptions towards students who do not share the same race/ethnicity and gender.
His findings suggest that demographic characteristics of students such as gender and race/ethnicity
may potentially matter for retention decisions as well, as they are partly based on teachers’ evalu-
ations of students.
Labelle and Figlio (2013) and Schwerdt et al. (2015) consider Florida’s test-based promotion
policy and evaluate various future outcomes. Labelle and Figlio (2013) stands out as most similar
to our approach (we discovered their conference draft after conducting our analysis). Labelle
and Figlio (2013) examine whether Florida’s grade retention policy that mandated promotion to
the fourth grade conditional on meeting a minimum standard in third grade reading was being
implemented differently depending on maternal education (using matched educational data and
birth records). They employ a regression discontinuity design, taking advantage of the score cutoff
for determining retention, finding that students whose mothers have less than a high school degree
are 20 percent more likely to be retained than students whose mothers have a bachelor’s degree
or more. Factors besides parental education, including eligibility for free school lunch and other
dimensions of student performance, shape heterogeneity in compliance as well. They also estimate
the effect of retention on future test scores instrumenting for grade retention with scoring below the
promotion cutoff. They find that retention leads to short-term gains in test scores but that the gains
fade out over time, consistent with Jacob and Lefgren (2009). They find no evidence, however, that
differential retention by maternal education has differential impacts on students’ future test scores.
Labelle and Figlio (2013) additionally show that students are more likely to be retained if they
are Black (9 percent increase), male (13 percent increase), have a foreign born mother (13 percent
increase), and qualify for free or reduced-price lunch (9 percent increase). Within subgroups cate-
gorized by student race, free or reduced-price lunch eligibility, and school characteristics, they still
find a similar (but imprecise) pattern in retention probabilities by maternal education. Heterogene-
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ity by student gender is not discussed. They attribute differential retention by maternal education
to systematic differences in parental behavior in response to retention risk, although they cannot
directly test this hypothesis.
Schwerdt et al. (2015) emphasize the impacts of test failure on retention and future outcomes.
They attempt to address the endogeneity of the subsequent exam to retention and consider sub-
sequent reading, Math test scores, and high school graduation. Short-term gains in both Math
and reading fade over time. They also find no clear impact on graduation and little evidence of
systematic heterogeneity by student and school characteristics. They also look at complier char-
acteristics (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) and find that a complier is more likely to score level 1 in
Math. Their conclusion is that early grade retention might be favorable (e.g. short-term gains and
no detrimental effects), although long-term benefits are uncertain.
At present, there is no published work using regression discontinuity methods to consider het-
erogeneity in compliance with exam failure/passing. The magnitude of heterogeneity we find in
New York City is substantially larger than that found in recent analyses of Florida students and
manifests along additional dimensions, e.g. gender of student and principal.
3.2.2 Promotion Policy
In New York, students in grades 3-8 take the State Math and English Language Arts (ELA)
tests each spring. The “scale score” is the number of correct answers converted into a vertically
comparable score (comparable across grades). Scale scores are categorized into four performance
levels separately for Math and ELA: level 1 - not meeting State learning standards, level 2 - partially
meeting State learning standards, level 3 - meeting State learning standards, and level 4 - exceeding
State learning standards.
Scoring level 2 (“partially meeting” standards) in both tests essentially guarantees promotion,
whereas students who score level 1 (“not meeting” standards) in either subject are at risk of being
retained. The failure threshold for each subject varies by year and grade. Retention procedures are
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less formalized in New York than Florida, with New York having few explicit exemptions. That
said, English Language Learners and students with disabilities who receive special education ser-
vices are exempt from New York’s stated promotion criteria.48 In our sample, 13% of students who
failed to meet the promotion cutoff were retained. Thus, there is substantial scope for heterogeneity
in compliance, driven predominantly by the “never takers”.
3.3 Data
We analyze administrative data from the New York City public school system for the 2007-
2008 to 2011-2012 academic years. Student-level panel data on New York State English Language
Arts (ELA) and Mathematics scale scores are merged to demographic characteristics, including
race, gender, free or reduced-price lunch eligibility, and age in months. Additionally, we observe
students’ weight, height, and BMI, measures further described in Almond et al. (2016). Unique
student identifiers allow us to track students over time as long as they stay in the New York City
public school system. When the student’s grade level in year t + 1 is the same as that in year t, we
code the student as retained. 1,507,700 student records for grades 3-8 are available 2007-2012, and
approximately 2% are retained. The retention rates in grades 3-8 have increased over time from
1% in 2007-2008 to 3% in 2010-2011. Over our analysis period, roughly 4% of students are ever
retained.
Table 3.1 reports mean student characteristics for the whole sample (column 1), those who
passed both tests but scored within 10 units of the cutoff (column 2), and those who failed to meet
the promotion cutoff in either test and within 10 scale score units (column 3). Relative to the overall
sample, students in this “retention window” are more likely to be Black or Hispanic, and less likely
to be Asian or White. The proportion of female students is lower, and the proportion of students
who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch higher near the cutoff. 13% of students below the
48 Empirically, however, we find that these groups of students were also affected by the policy and thus do not
exclude them in our analysis. That said, our results are not sensitive to excluding them.
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failure threshold were retained while 0.7% of those “just above” the threshold were retained.
3.4 Estimation
To assess heterogeneity in how standardized test scores are utilized, we exploit the jump in
retention rates at the failure threshold in a regression discontinuity framework. We estimate the
following equation both “pooled” and separately by student characteristics:
Yigs,t+1 = α0 + α1 · 1[Xigst < 0] + α2 · Xigst + α3 · 1[Xigst < 0] · Xigst + ηgst +  igst (11)
where i is individual, g is grade, s is subject, and t is year. Y is an indicator for whether the
student is retained or not. Xigst is minimum of the Math and English test scores, re-centered to
zero at their respective failure thresholds. We use this measure as the main running variable, since
students are at risk of grade retention when they score level 1 in either Math or English test.
We fit a linear relationship between the scale score and the probability of retention, allow-
ing for different slopes above and below the cutoff (consistent with our figures). We include
year×grade×subject fixed effects, ηgst , to control for year-, grade-, and subject-specific cutoffs.
We estimate equation (1) by OLS and report robust standard errors.49 We focus on the roughly
250,000 student observations within 10 scale score (approximately one third of a standard devia-
tion for both Math and English) of the cutoff. In the tables, we report the RD estimate α1, which
measures the size of the discontinuity at the failure threshold.
3.4.1 Discontinuities in Baseline Covariates?
Figure 3.1 shows histograms of the running variable both in the full sample (panel (a)) and
within 10 scale score from the failure cutoff (panel (b)). We do not observe any heaping around the
49We do not cluster our standard errors at the running variable level since we found out that clustered standard
errors from separate regressions are inconsistent with clustered standard errors from pooled regressions. In addition,
Kolesár and Rothe (2016) argue that the convention of clustering standard errors on the running variable performs
poorly in a regression discontinuity framework with a discrete running variable.
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failure cutoff (normalized to 0).50 As there is no evidence of manipulation around the cutoff, we ex-
pect students to have similar characteristics above and below the cutoff. We summarize covariates
by predicting the probability of retention using student gender, race/ethnicity, age in months, BMI,
height, weight, free or reduced-price lunch eligibility, special education participation, and previous
Math and English scale scores. Figure 3.2 compares this predicted probability of retention around
the cutoff. There is no evidence of a discontinuity at the cutoff in the full sample (panel (a)) nor
separately for females (panel (b)) or for Black students (panel (c)). The corresponding regression
estimates of the discontinuities are precisely estimated zeros.
3.5 Results
Figure 3.3 summarizes the mean probability of retention for students near the cutoff. Con-
sistent with stated school policy, the probability of retention drops discontinuously at the cutoff.
Moreover, the linear specification seems to fit the data well (Gelman and Imbens, 2014). Table
3.2 reports the RD estimates from estimating equation (1) “pooled” and separately by subgroup.
Overall, failing to meet the promotion cutoff increases the probability of retention by 5 percentage
points (column 1).
We are particularly interested in documenting whether exam failure has different retention con-
sequences by baseline characteristics. Panel A of Table 3.2 shows that Black students are 3.4
percentage points more likely to be retained than White students, more than double the White re-
tention probability as induced by failure (2.9%). Hispanic students are around 2 percentage points
more likely to be retained than non-Hispanic Whites, a 60% increase. Asians are, if anything, are
less likely to be retained than non-Hispanic White students when they fail to meet the cutoff.
Girls are 1.2 percentage points (or 27%) more likely to be retained than boys failing the exam
50Dee et al. (2011) document evidence of manipulation of Regent’s exam scores among New York City high
school students, finding “roughly 3 to 5 percent of the exam scores that qualified for a high school diploma actually
had performance below the state requirement”. Key for us, they do not find any evidence of manipulation on the
statewide Math and English exams given to students in grades 3-8. Likewise, we detect no evidence of manipulation
among the proficiency exams taken prior to high school (i.e. grades 3-8).
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(panel B of Table 3.2). The gender difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (p-value
= 0.005). This is intriguing since the overall retention rate in grades 3-8 is higher for boys (2.1%)
than for girls (1.7%). But when we examine the retention rates in a narrow window near the failure
threshold, we find the opposite: girls are more likely to be retained than boys. Additionally, we
find that low performance on previous year’s Math test increases the probability of retention (panel
C in Table 3.2).51 Finally, those who are eligible for subsidized lunch are 1.3 percentage points
more likely to be retained than those ineligible (panel D in Table 3.2).
Figure 3.4 presents these findings graphically. Panel (a) shows a large disparity in retention be-
tween Black and White students below the cutoff. Likewise, panel (b) shows the mean probability
of retention is higher for Hispanics than for Whites, although the gap is smaller. Panel (c) shows
that mean retention probabilities are similar between Asians and Whites. Panel (d) shows Blacks
and Hispanics are roughly twice as likely to be retained than Asians and Whites when they fail.
Panel (e) shows that girls are more likely to be retained than boys conditional on scoring identically
below the cutoff. Below the threshold, the girl mean is above the boy mean at each scale score,
but means are indistinguishable above the threshold. Additionally, we examine whether the proba-
bility of retention differs by age for grade, height for grade, and weight status category. We might
expect students who are younger or smaller than their peers in the same grade are more likely to be
retained, since they would potentially fit in better in their repeated grade (socially, physically, and
academically). Parents might also be less likely to object to the retention decision if their child was
a “close call” with respect to age at school entry cutoff. We also test whether students who are “too
big to fail” are in fact less likely to be retained. However, we find surprisingly little heterogeneity
along these dimensions (Table 3.3).
Given the stark heterogeneity by ethnicity and gender, we consider interactions between these
51Additionally, we examine whether the demographic heterogeneity we find disappears once we condition on
previous test scores. We estimate separate regressions by student characteristics for each decile of previous test scores.
We find that ethnicity and gender heterogeneity in retention probability generally persist across the distributions. This
suggests that there are other factors driving the differential retention probabilities that are independent of previous
academic performance.
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dimensions. The gender gap is especially large among Whites (5.9 percentage points versus 0.9
percentage points). For all ethnicity groups, we find that girls are more likely to be retained than
boys.
3.5.1 Racial Composition of Schools
Here we explore the role of school-level differences in explaining heterogeneity. Retention
policies and practices are shaped by principals and teachers, and thus may differ by school. Given
pronounced residential sorting within New York City, Black students might disproportionately
attend schools that more strictly adhere to a test-based promotion policy than schools White stu-
dents attend. We examine whether the probability of retention due to exam failure differs between
schools with different Black shares, dividing schools into three equal-sized groups by their propor-
tion of Black students: low (mean 5%), middle (mean 24%), and high (mean 60%). The overall
mean retention rate in grades 3-8 is higher in high share schools (2.8%) than low share schools
(0.8%). Furthermore, predominantly Black schools tend to be high compliance schools, i.e. where
discontinuity in retention rates is larger at the failure threshold.52 Thus school-level differences
can “explain” (in a statistical sense) some of the individual differences in retention by race.
However, panel A of Table 3.4 shows that the Black-White gap in the probability of retention
is much larger in schools with low share of Black students. At predominantly Black schools, we
do not see a racial disparity in the effect of failing the exam. The difference in retention probability
between Black and White students is only 0.7 percentage points, and it is not statistically signif-
icant. Panel B shows that these findings are not sensitive to including school fixed effects (nor
would we expect them to be, as retention’s predictors are and should be continuous at the cutoff).
Thus, Black students are more likely to be retained within predominantly non-Black schools. To
summarize, higher black retention rates are attributable to both school-level differences and dif-
52Exam failure increases retention probability by 3.6 percentage points in low share schools, by 4.4 percentage
points in middle share schools, and by 6.5 percentage points in high share schools.
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ferential responses to failure within predominantly non-Black schools. More generally, including
school fixed effects indeed leaves our impact estimates essentially unchanged, including impact
estimates by demographic subgroup.
3.5.2 Student-level Differences
Because students are not segregated by gender in New York City schools, gender heterogeneity
in compliance cannot be driven by differences in school-level characteristics. We examine other
observable student-level differences which may explain the gender gap. For instance, students
who are more likely to be retained conditional on identical test scores might perform worse in
other performance measures. This exercise is necessarily imperfect because we do not observe
everything observed by teachers, principals, and parents. On the other hand, as researchers we
do observe some key information unobserved by schools and parents: information on the future
academic performance of students.
We compare average performance of girls and boys in baseline test scores, baseline attendance
rate, and future test scores. (We depart from usual regression discontinuity analyses by not inter-
preting the jump scores at the failure threshold.53) As in previous studies, girls perform better than
or as well as boys on average along these dimensions. Conditional on scoring identically on the
baseline Math test in our retention window, girls also score better than boys on baseline English
test, future Math test, and future English test. Moreover, they have similar slopes in the relation-
ship between other test scores and baseline Math score as boys, implying that the predictive power
of baseline test score is not different by gender (panel (a) of Figure 3.5).54 Panel (b) shows that
the slope of Black students above the cutoff is also similar to that of White students. It remains a
53The particular exam taken is determined by a student’s year in school, so the exam taken changes discontinuously
at the threshold due to retention. If one is willing to ignore that potential compositional effect, there is an apparent
increase in short-run academic performance due to retention, as has been found in previous literature. See Section
3.5.5.
54The relationship above the failure cutoff is easier to interpret because it is not affected by endogenous retention.
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puzzle that girls are about 25% more likely to be retained when they fail compared to boys, and
that this gender gap is especially large for Whites.
Additionally, we examine whether heterogeneity in short-run benefits of retention can explain
higher retention of girls and minorities conditional on test score. As retained and promoted students
take different tests in subsequent years, it is fundamentally difficult to compare future test scores
below and above the threshold. We attempt to address this issue by comparing same-grade test
scores both in the baseline grade (i.e. test scores in the baseline year for the promoted versus test
scores in the following year for the retained) and one grade above (i.e. test scores in the following
year for the promoted versus test scores two years later for the retained). We find no obvious and
robust heterogeneity in these future test scores, suggesting that it is unlikely that larger potential
benefits on future performance for girls and minorities drive the differential retention decisions in
the baseline.
3.5.3 Who Done It?
In this section, we focus on the role of principals. Teachers’ perceptions of students can be
based on their racial/ethnic and gender similarities to students (Dee, 2005). Unfortunately, we do
not observe the classroom to which students are assigned within grade and school (or the demo-
graphics of teachers). But according to the New York City Department of Education website:
Principals will review these portfolios in August and make a holistic promotion deci-
sion for each student. Superintendents will continue to review promotion appeals for
cases in which a parent disagrees with the principal’s decision.
As the final retention decision is made by principals and superintendents, we utilize data on school
principal demographics, which come from a single 2008 cross-section of roughly 1,400 schools.
This yields a subsample of 19,421 student records within 10 scale score of the cutoff. We consider
whether the gender gap in retention varies by principal’s gender.
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Table 3.5 shows that the female-male difference in retention probability is pronounced in
schools with female principals, while it essentially disappears in male principal schools. This
is consistent with the findings from Hanna and Linden (2012) (admittedly in a radically different
context): “In fact, we observe the opposite, with discrimination against the low-caste children
being driven by low-caste graders, and graders from the high-caste groups appearing not to dis-
criminate at all even when controlling for the education and age of grader”. On gender, we do
not know of an economics of education paper with a similar finding to ours. Bagues et al. (2015)
argue that having women on faculty review committees in Italy and Spain, if anything, leads to
fewer female faculty being promoted.
Additionally, we find that the Black-White gap in retention probability is large (11.3 percent-
age points versus 6.2 percentage points) in schools with White principals. The ethnicity gap dis-
appears and is imprecisely estimated in Black principal schools, although this is partly due to the
small number of White students in these schools. Because other (unobserved) characteristics of
the school presumably vary by principal’s observed characteristics, however, we characterize this
pattern as descriptive.
3.5.4 Statistical Discrimination
Can the canonical theory of statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner and
Cain, 1977) explain the heterogeneity we find? Through this lens, principals make the retention
decision based on the current test score, x, which is a noisy signal for the true level of academic
success in the next grade, q. That is, x = q + u where u ∼ N (0,σ2u ). In addition, principals
have formed expectations of academic success for different demographic groups from experience:
qs ∼ N (q¯s,σ2q,s). Let s = { f ,m} denote the gender group. Then, the expected academic success of







(Since the signal s may be more informative for one group than another, we let σ2u to vary across
groups and denote it as σ2u,s.) Intuitively, if the observed signal is noisy, αs goes down and thus
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principals would put more weight on group mean and less weight weight on the observed signal.
The female-male difference in the expected academic success conditional on scoring identically
x = k on the current test is:
E(q |x = k, s = f ) − E(q |x = k, s = m) = (α f k + (1 − α f )q¯ f ) − (αmk + (1 − αm)q¯m)
If we assume that there is no difference in group mean, q¯ f = q¯m = q¯, the above equation
reduces to (α f − αm)(k − q¯). Therefore, if the current test score is a noisier measure for boys than
for girls (i.e. α f > αm), the female-male difference in the expected academic success is negative
for below average students (k < q¯).
Turning to our data, we assume that principals have formed expectations of group performance
based on previous year’s Math test score and observe current year’s Math test score. In our full
sample, previous year’s Math test score is slightly higher on average (q¯ f = 681.7 and q¯m = 680.7)
and more precise (σ2q, f = 33.5
2 and σ2q,m = 34.62) for girls. In addition, the current Math test
score is noisier for boys (σ2u, f = 31.9
2 and σ2u,m = 32.82). Using these estimates, E(q |x = k, s =
f ) − E(q |x = k, s = m) = −0.002k + 1.998. Evaluating this at the mean current Math test score
below the cutoff x = 637.4, we find that the female-male difference is small and rather positive
(−0.002(637.4) + 1.998 = 0.7). In this simple framework, the signal for boys is not noisy enough
for our findings to be consistent with statistical discrimination.
3.5.5 BMI Impacts?
As in previous econometric studies of retention, considering the causal effects on subsequent
academic performance is not straight-forward even with a valid instrument for retention. This is
because the grade level of the exam students take in subsequent year is endogenous to retention
decision. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish the endogenous “exam taken” effect from the effect
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of retention on academic performance. We do not have a “silver bullet” solution to this problem.55
However, BMI testing does not vary by grade, and thus its evaluation is not compromised
by endogenous retention. Moreover, as BMI percentiles vary by age in months and age itself is
unaffected by retention, BMI percentiles are comparable for retained versus non-retained students.
Furthermore, we observe BMI for all students, and have sufficient power to consider biometric
impacts. Following a health economics literature on peer effects in BMI (Halliday and Kwak,
2009), timing of puberty and its responsiveness to social/environmental factors (Bharadwaj and
Cullen, 2013), we test whether the higher probability of retention due to exam failure affects BMI
in the following year. We instrument for retention with scoring below the failure threshold and
estimate the effect of retention on next year BMI using 2SLS. Table 3.6 shows that retention due
to exam failure does not have a statistically significant impact on next year BMI, although point
estimates indicate that grade retention might lower BMI relative to promoted peers. We conclude
the peer effect on BMI is not large in our compliant sub-population, although our 2SLS estimates
are somewhat imprecise.
3.5.6 Complier Characteristics
In this section, we take a more systematic approach to describing heterogeneity in compli-
ance to the retention policy. The LATE theorem states that if treatment effects are heterogeneous,
an instrument captures the causal effect for the sub-population of compliers (in our application,
those who are retained as a result of exam failure). While it is not possible to identify individual
compliers, it is possible to describe the distribution of complier characteristics. We estimate com-
pliers’ mean observable characteristics following Angrist and Pischke (2009); Almond and Doyle
(2011).56
55Mariano and Martorell (2013) address the endogeneity by estimating “external drift”, which we do not pursue
here.
56Curiously, seven years after Angrist and Pischke (2009) recounted a straight-forward approach to describe com-
pliers, empirical economists seldom do. Recent methodological contributions in Angrist and Fernández-Val (2013),
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Table 3.7 shows that mean characteristics in fact vary substantially across different samples.
Compliers are less likely to be Asian or White, while they are much more likely to be Black (49%)
compared to those both in our retention window (38%) and in the full sample (31%). Insofar as race
is concerned, compliance appears more selective than does scoring near the threshold. Turning to
income, scoring near the threshold increases the share receiving a reduced-price lunch from 86 to
93%, while compliers are “only” 95% poor. Thus, performance on the test is more strongly related
to income rather than how the test is used. Turning to gender, compliers are on average 48%
female, versus 46% in our retention window (and 50% overall). The fraction obese is remarkably
similar across these subgroups.
3.6 Discussion
The process by which retention decisions are made is often opaque despite utilization of stan-
dardized test scores and common thresholds. There is little systematic evidence on this “black
box”. We find both the magnitude and nature of this heterogeneity surprising. Why are younger
students not more likely to be retained conditional on their exam score? In contrast, both race and
gender help predict retention conditional on the baseline test score. Compliance with proficiency
exams in New York City is thus selective. We find these descriptive patterns interesting per se
and invite additional research on whether retention decisions are “fair”. Are girls and minorities
over-retained? The need for such work is underscored by previous research (from other contexts
where students can be tracked for longer time periods) that there may be long-term impacts on
marginally-retained students (Jacob and Lefgren, 2009). Such outcomes may be more important
than the shorter-term benefits students show somewhat mechanically from repeating material they
have seen in the previous year. Thus, it is not merely the case that the retention decision is per-
ceived at the time as momentous by parents and students.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of the running variable
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Figure 3.2: Predicted probability of retention
Notes: We estimate the predicted probability of retention using gender, race/ethnicity, age in months, BMI, height,
weight, free or reduced-price lunch eligibility, special education participation, and previous Math and English scale
scores. Each circle plots mean predicted probability of retention within each one scale score bin. The size of the circle
depends on the number of observations in each bin. Lines are the fitted values from a regressions of the predicted
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Figure 3.3: Probability of retention
Notes: Each circle plots mean probability of retention within each one scale score bin. The size of the circle depends
on the number of observations in each bin. Lines are the fitted values from a regressions of a retention dummy on the
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Figure 3.4: Heterogeneity in compliance
Notes: Each circle (or triangle) plots mean probability of retention within each one scale score bin. The size of the
circle (or triangle) depends on the number of observations in each bin. Lines are the fitted values from a regression of
a retention dummy on the exam failure dummy, allowing for different slopes above and below the cutoff. We divide
each grade into three equal-sized groups based on age in months for grade. Panel (f) compares the youngest group
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Figure 3.5: Next year Math scale score
Notes: We use the re-centered baseline Math test score conditional on passing English as the running variable. Each
circle (or triangle) plots mean Math test scores in the subsequent year within each one scale score bin. The size of the
circle (or triangle) depends on the number of observations in each bin. Lines are the fitted values from a regressions
of next year Math test score on the exam failure dummy, allowing for different slopes above and below the cutoff.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Retention window
All Above Below
Asian 0.154 0.079 0.069
Black 0.307 0.376 0.388
Hispanic 0.394 0.469 0.485
White 0.142 0.073 0.054
Female 0.500 0.467 0.448
Free or reduced-price lunch 0.860 0.930 0.941
Age in months 133.1 134.5 135.7
Weight (lbs) 101.2 104.7 105.4
Height (inches) 58.2 58.4 58.5
Math level 1 0.049 0.000 0.376
Math level 2 0.245 0.712 0.482
Math level 3 0.461 0.261 0.132
Math level 4 0.245 0.027 0.010
English level 1 0.074 0.000 0.723
English level 2 0.370 0.957 0.256
English level 3 0.504 0.042 0.021
English level 4 0.053 0.001 0.000
Retention 0.018 0.007 0.128
N 1,507,700 77,543 168,047
Notes: Retention window indicates 10 scale score above and below the failure threshold.
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Table 3.2: Effect of exam failure on the probability of retention
A. Ethnicity B. Gender
All Asian Black Hispanic White Female Male
Below cutoff 0.050 0.021 0.063 0.047 0.029 0.057 0.045
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 245,590 18,636 93,331 116,477 16,383 113,207 132,383
Mean below cutoff 0.128 0.080 0.162 0.113 0.080 0.137 0.122
Mean above cutoff 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008
C. Previous Math test score D. Subsidized lunch
Low Middle High Eligible Not eligible
Below cutoff 0.092 0.049 0.021 0.051 0.038
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008)
Observations 55,800 53,868 55,312 223,661 15,956
Mean below cutoff 0.157 0.133 0.086 0.129 0.112
Mean above cutoff 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.009
Notes: Each column reports the estimated discontinuity in the probability of retention for different subsamples. We
assume linear relationship between the retention probability and test scores, and allow for different slopes above and
below the threshold. We control for year×grade×subject fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
In panel C, we divide the sample into three equal-sized groups based on last year’s Math scale score. Subsidized lunch
in panel D indicates free or reduced-price lunch eligibility.
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Table 3.3: Effect of exam failure on the probability of retention
A. Age for grade B. Height for grade C. Weight status
Young Middle Old Short Middle Tall Underweight Healthy Overweight Obese
Below cutoff 0.045 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.045 0.052 0.063 0.049 0.042 0.056
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 60,054 61,948 105,338 54,018 73,424 89,368 7,512 112,641 40,757 84,680
Mean below cutoff 0.128 0.131 0.123 0.123 0.130 0.124 0.116 0.129 0.126 0.130
Mean above cutoff 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.012
Notes: Each column reports the estimated discontinuity in the probability of retention for different subsamples. We
assume linear relationship between the retention probability and test scores, and allow for different slopes above and
below the threshold. We control for year×grade×subject fixed effects. We divide each grade into three equal-sized
groups based on age in months for grade (panel A) and height for grade (panel B). Each student’s body mass index
(BMI) is classified to be underweight, healthy, overweight, and obese based on age- and sex-specific BMI cutoffs from
Centers for Disease Control.
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneity by school’s proportion of Black students
Low (mean=5%) High (mean=60%)
Asian Black Hispanic White Asian Black Hispanic White
A. Without school fixed effects
Below cutoff 0.027 0.055 0.039 0.017 0.023 0.066 0.064 0.059
(0.008) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.017) (0.005) (0.007) (0.024)
B. With school fixed effects
Below cutoff 0.026 0.058 0.040 0.017 0.022 0.067 0.063 0.065
(0.008) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.019) (0.004) (0.007) (0.028)
Observations 11,475 4,133 40,165 10,612 2,988 68,828 26,948 1,797
Mean below cutoff 0.069 0.123 0.094 0.070 0.102 0.167 0.132 0.105
Mean above cutoff 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.009
Notes: We divide schools into three equal-sized groups by schools’ proportion of Black students. The mean proportion
of Black students is 5% in low share schools. It is 60% in high share schools. Each column reports the estimated
discontinuity in the probability of retention for different race/ethnicity groups. We assume linear relationship between
the retention probability and test scores, and allow for different slopes above and below the threshold. We control for
year×grade×subject fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
Table 3.5: Gender heterogeneity in retention probability by principal’s gender
Female principal Male principal
Student: Female Male Female Male
Below cutoff 0.135 0.081 0.070 0.083
(0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.022)
Observations 6,481 7,188 2,689 3,063
Mean below cutoff 0.133 0.123 0.101 0.120
Mean above cutoff 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.011
Notes: We utilize data on principal gender from 2007-2008. First two columns compare the estimated discontinu-
ity in the probability of retention by student gender in schools with a female principal. Last two columns examine
heterogeneity by student gender in schools with a male principal. We assume linear relationship between the re-
tention probability and test scores, and allow for different slopes above and below the threshold. We control for
year×grade×subject fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Effect of retention on next year BMI
By ethnicity By gender
All Asian Black Hispanic White Female Male
Retention -0.413 4.773 -0.143 -0.981 3.275 -1.019 0.321
(0.958) (7.809) (1.283) (1.435) (6.366) (1.273) (1.450)
Observations 208,916 17,171 76,138 100,075 14,841 96,119 112,797
Mean below cutoff 21.9 20.1 21.9 22.2 21.3 22.0 21.7
Mean above cutoff 21.8 20.0 21.9 22.1 21.1 21.9 21.6
Notes: Each column reports the estimated effect of retention on next year BMI for different subsamples. We instrument
for retention with scoring below the failure threshold and estimate the effect of retention on next year BMI using 2SLS.
We assume linear relationship between next year BMI and test scores, and allow for different slopes above and below
the threshold. We control for year×grade×subject fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
Table 3.7: Mean characteristics
Complier Retention window All
Characteristic E(X |D1 = 1,D0 = 0) (N=245,590) (N=1,507,700)
Asian 0.043 0.076 0.154
Black 0.492 0.380 0.307
Hispanic 0.428 0.474 0.394
White 0.033 0.067 0.142
Female 0.482 0.461 0.501
Free or reduced-price lunch 0.950 0.933 0.860
Age in months 135.2 134.9 133.1
Weight (lbs) 105.1 104.9 101.2
Height (inches) 58.5 58.5 58.2
Obese 0.338 0.345 0.332
N 245,590 1,507,700
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Appendix A. Hospital Payments Under MMC
A.1 State Payments to Health Plans
The state negotiates with each health plan to determine monthly capitation payments in New
York State. Health plans submit data on enrollees and previous expenditures and propose new
rates based on expected costs for each region they participate. The state reviews the data and offers
a new set of rates that vary by age, sex, and region. These rates are applicable for a one-year
period. The plans can receive a bonus up to 3 percent of the rate based on their performance on
quality measures. In 2008, the state introduced a new payment system that accounts for health
conditions of the enrollees by adjusting the capitation rates by Clinical Risk Groups. This new
payment system was fully implemented in 2011 (Sparer, 2008).57
The New York State Medicaid program paid a monthly capitation rate of $138 on average for
newborns younger than six months old in 1998 (Holahan and Schirmer, 1999), which is roughly
$190 in 2011 values. For newborn services, however, plans receive lump-sum payments for costs
related to newborn medical care in addition to monthly capitation payments. These lump-sum pay-
ments range from $2,277 to $6,651 per newborn weighing 1,200 grams or more (NYS Comptroller,
2014). Effective April 2012 following the expansion of the MMC mandate to infants with birth
weight below 1,200 grams, plans receive lump-sum payments ranging from $68,355 to $105,108
per newborn for these low birth weight enrollees.
In return, health plans are responsible for providing health care services to their enrollees.
Health plans offer a network of health care providers to their enrollees and reimburse the providers
for their services. Health plans employ a number of payment methods to reimburse providers. I
focus on reimbursement for inpatient services in this paper.
57It is unclear whether risk-adjusted payments can in fact reduce adverse selection and thus reduce government
spending (Brown et al., 2014).
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A.2 Plan Payments to Hospitals
For patients enrolled in MMC, hospitals are paid in several ways depending on contractual
details between health plans and hospitals. However, plan-to-provider payment rates for MMC in
New York State are classified as confidential and proprietary and thus not available. Although the
exact payment methods and rates are unknown, most health plans in New York State reimburse
providers through primary care capitation models (UHF, 2000). Inpatient payments associated
with newborn medical care are often excluded in monthly capitation payments for primary care
capitation models and are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis using a Diagnosis-Related Group
(DRG) method.58 That is, each inpatient stay is classified into a DRG, and Medicaid pays a fixed
rate to hospitals based on the DRG assigned to the patient (Quinn, 2008).
The New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) provides inpatient payments base rates
for enrollees in both the FFS system and the MMC system along with weights for each DRG.59
The state Medicaid program uses the FFS rates for inpatient payments for patients enrolled in FFS.
The MMC rates are intended to be used by health plans as base rates in negotiation with hospitals.
As expected, these MMC rates are generally lower than the FFS rates that the state uses to pay
hospitals directly. In 2009, for instance, the base discharge rate for FFS was $6,471.31 on average,
while the base contract discharge rate for MMC was $5,284 on average.
58New York State implemented a severity-based methodology, All Patient Refined Diagnosis Related Groups
(APR-DRGs) effective December 1, 2009. Prior to that, New York State utilized All Patient Diagnosis Related Groups




Appendix B. Computing Complier Characteristics
I follow the estimation proposed by Almond and Doyle (2011) to compute complier character-
istics:
E(X |compliers) = pC + pA
pC
[
E(X |D = 1, Z = 1) − pA
pC + pA
E(X |D = 1, Z = 0)
]
where X indicates hospital/patient characteristics, D denotes the treatment, which is MMC par-
ticipation in my context. Z denotes the instrument, which is exceeding the 1,200-gram threshold
under the RD framework and the county-specific MMC mandate under the DD framework. pA is
the proportion of always takers, and pN is the proportion of never takers. Assuming monotonicity
(i.e., no defiers), I compute the proportion of compliers using the estimates, pC = 1 − pA − pN .60
Given the independence of Z , I use the sample proportion of those enrolled in MMC even
though their birth weight is below the threshold to estimate pA in the RD framework. Similarly,
for the DD framework, I use the sample proportion of those enrolled in MMC even though the
MMC mandate is not implemented in their county. To estimate pN for the RD framework, I use the
sample proportion of those who are not enrolled in MMC even though their birth weight is above
the threshold. For the DD framework, I use the sample proportion of those who are not enrolled in
MMC even though the MMC mandate is implemented in their county.
I use sample means for those who are affected by the instrument and participate in Medicaid
HMO to estimate E(X |D = 1, Z = 1) and sample means for those who are not affected by the
instrument but participate in Medicaid HMO to estimate E(X |D = 1, Z = 0). Tables below
present each parameter for two instruments and show the estimates of E(X |D = 1, Z = 1) and
E(X |D = 1, Z = 0) used in computing complier means in Table 1.11.
60The size of compliers can also be estimated from a simple regression of D on a binary Z .
110
RD DD
Z Birth weight≥1,200 g Years following the MMC mandate
pA 0.04 0.05
pN 0.74 0.73
pC = 1 − pA − pN 0.22 0.22
RD DD
E(X |D = 1, Z = 1) E(X |D = 1, Z = 0) E(X |D = 1, Z = 1) E(X |D = 1, Z = 0)
Panel A. Hospital characteristics
Total beds 745.0 675.7 641.1 670.5
NICU beds 20.2 18.2 14.1 12.8
Number of physicians 177.1 108.7 148.8 150.2
Number of nurses 1256.5 1078.0 1039.1 790.5
Total admissions 34684.6 31752.9 30693.1 25785.4
Total births 3819.4 3505.5 3626.9 3213.5
NICU 0.92 0.88 0.80 0.76
Teaching hospital 0.68 0.59 0.56 0.57
Indigent care 0.71 0.65 0.69 0.31
Lives covered, capitated (1995 values) 6488.8 3423.4 5613.2 4831.9
Share covered by Medicaid, infants 0.57 0.54 0.59 0.57
Share covered by Medicaid, all patients 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.39
Share covered by HMO, infants 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.20
Share covered by HMO, all patients 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.17
Panel B. Patient characteristics
Birth weight (grams) 1278.7 1120.6 3265.8 3277.2
Fraction low birth weight (<2,500 grams) 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.08
Female 0.49 0.43 0.48 0.49
White 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.28
Black 0.37 0.33 0.22 0.31
Hispanic 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.22
Asian 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.04
Median income, quartile 1 0.53 0.38 0.47 0.17
Median income, quartile 2 0.20 0.32 0.22 0.33
Median income, quartile 3 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.47
Median income, quartile 4 0.11 0.18 0.13 0.04
Admission scheduled 0.61 0.59 0.83 0.69
Admission on the weekend 0.25 0.33 0.23 0.25
Observations 8848 8848 4173544 4173544
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(d) Top quartile
Figure C.1: Mean frequency of the running variable by each 20-gram bin, by predicted list prices
Notes: Predicted list prices are computed from regressions of total charges on principal diagnosis and principal pro-
cedure fixed effects. I divide the sample by quartiles using the predicted list prices. Each panel plots mean frequency
for each 20-gram bin (dots) along with a local linear regression fitted lines (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals
below and above the threshold for each quartile of predicted list prices. I use the triangular kernel and a bandwidth of
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Figure C.2: Log(length of stay) for infants routinely discharged
Notes: The figure plots mean values of log(length of stay) for each 20-gram bin (dots) along with a local linear regres-
sion fitted lines (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals below and above the threshold. The sample is restricted to
those who are routinely discharged from birth hospitals. Each 20-gram bin contains roughly 250 discharge records. I
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(f) Mortality during hospitalization
Figure C.3: Effects of birth weight≥1,200 grams on discharge outcomes at birth, rest of the state
Notes: Panels (a)-(d) plot mean values of each outcome variable for each 20-gram bin (dots) along with a local linear
regression fitted lines (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals below and above the threshold. For panels (e) and (f)
I use a bigger 30-gram bin for better visibility since transfer and death are both rare events and thus noisy. I use the
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(f) Mortality during hospitalization
Figure C.4: Effects of birth weight≥1,200 grams on cumulative outcomes, rest of the state
Notes: Each outcome aggregates the value at the individual level including the value at transferred hospitals (if trans-
ferred). Panels (a)-(d) plot mean values of each outcome variable for each 20-gram bin (dots) along with a local linear
regression fitted lines (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals below and above the threshold. For panels (e) and (f)
I use a bigger 30-gram bin for better visibility since transfer and death are both rare events and thus noisy. I use the
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Figure C.5: Proximity to the nearest hospital with a NICU facility
Notes: Navy bars show the density of New York City hospitals by the distance to the nearest hospital with a NICU.
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Figure C.6: An example hospital, 2005
Notes: This figures illustrates the monthly NICU occupancy for an example hospital in the year 2005. For
instance, around 22 infants were admitted to NICU in January 2005 and stayed for at least 10 days. I use
this value as an indication of the NICU occupancy for infants born in February. The figure shows that there
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Figure C.7: Sensitivity to bandwidth and polynomial, New York City
Notes: I repeat the estimation for each outcome for a different choice of bandwidth and polynomial. I use a range
of bandwidths from 100 grams to 500 grams varying the degree of polynomials from degree 1 (linear), degree 2
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Figure C.7: Sensitivity to bandwidth and polynomial, New York City (continued)
Notes: I repeat the estimation for each outcome for a different choice of bandwidth and polynomial. I use a range
of bandwidths from 100 grams to 500 grams varying the degree of polynomials from degree 1 (linear), degree 2
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Figure C.8: Medicaid HMO participation by years from the MMC mandate
Notes: The above figure plots estimates from a regression of an indicator for Medicaid HMO participation on a set
of dummies that indicate years from the MMC mandate for each county. County fixed effects, year fixed effects,
and county-specific time trends are also included in the regression. The dashed lines plot 95% confidence intervals
computed based on standard errors clustered at the county level.
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Appendix D. Appendix Tables
Table D.1: Effects of birth weight≥1,200 grams on other health/quality outcomes, New York City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Avoidable Level IV Any Chest Ultrasound Implant Physical Respiratory Speech
readmission NICU stay NICU stay X-ray therapy therapy therapy
Above 0.002 -0.002 0.008 -0.028 -0.022 -0.006 0.041∗∗ -0.007 0.006
(0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.025) (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Observations 4065 4315 4315 3221 3221 3221 4315 3221 3221
Mean below cutoff 0.052 0.873 0.905 0.801 0.895 0.025 0.127 0.947 0.091
Mean above cutoff 0.043 0.869 0.905 0.754 0.885 0.024 0.118 0.893 0.080
Bandwidth (grams) 150 200 200 150 150 150 200 150 150
Notes: Column 1 shows the RD estimate for hospital readmission due to preventable conditions. Columns 2-9 show
the RD estimates for utilization of various inpatient services at the individual level. In addition to the indicator for
birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression includes a linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed effects, admission
month fixed effects, and hospital county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
120
Table D.2: Heterogeneity by NICU crowdedness, relative to the number of beds, New York City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Below the median NICU occupancy relative to the number of beds
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.205∗∗∗ -0.043 -0.048 0.024 0.018 0.020
(0.035) (0.078) (0.101) (0.098) (0.026) (0.030)
Observations 1266 947 942 732 1266 645
Mean below cutoff 0.017 53.0 $284,947 $107,507 0.058 0.036
Mean above cutoff 0.242 43.8 $253,561 $92,292 0.046 0.030
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel B. Above the median NICU occupancy relative to the number of beds
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.244∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.028
(0.030) (0.076) (0.092) (0.098) (0.019) (0.029)
Observations 1744 1302 1298 982 1744 859
Mean below cutoff 0.016 53.1 $287,583 $106,648 0.040 0.040
Mean above cutoff 0.261 42.3 $230,545 $86,728 0.051 0.039
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: I divide the monthly NICU occupancy measure by the number of NICU beds. Since the mean length of stay for
infants who stay in NICU for at least 10 days is around one month, this measure roughly captures the daily occupancy
rate in a given month. Panel A shows the RD estimates for months when this relative NICU occupancy rate is below
the median for a given hospital in a given year. Panel B shows the RD estimates for months when the relative NICU
occupancy rate is above the median for a given hospital-year. In addition to the indicator for birth weight≥1,200 g,
each regression includes a linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed effects, admission month fixed effects,
and hospital county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported. The means of logged outcomes are reported in
levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table D.3: Heterogeneity by crowdedness at the typical destination, New York City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Below the median NICU occupancy at the typical destination
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.228∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.219∗∗ 0.038 0.022
(0.028) (0.077) (0.099) (0.106) (0.023) (0.027)
Observations 1826 1349 1343 1015 1826 904
Mean below cutoff 0.019 52.4 $276,442 $106,429 0.067 0.027
Mean above cutoff 0.262 42.1 $228,440 $84,086 0.064 0.033
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel B. Above the median NICU occupancy at the typical destination
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.261∗∗∗ -0.133 -0.134 -0.279∗∗ 0.008 0.018
(0.038) (0.102) (0.119) (0.133) (0.023) (0.037)
Observations 1256 939 936 692 1256 647
Mean below cutoff 0.031 52.3 $264,805 $104,435 0.064 0.051
Mean above cutoff 0.320 43.6 $234,905 $90,673 0.062 0.039
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: I define a typical destination hospital as the receiving hospital of the majority of any neonatal transfers from
a given hospital. Panel A shows the RD estimates for months when the NICU occupancy at the typical destination
hospital with a NICU is below the median, while panel B shows the RD estimates for months when the NICU occu-
pancy at the typical destination hospital is above the median in a given hospital-year. In addition to the indicator for
birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression includes a linear spline of birth weight, admission year fixed effects, admission
month fixed effects, and hospital county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported. The means of logged out-
comes are reported in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table D.4: Difference-in-difference estimates, other health/quality outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any NICU stay Chest X-ray Ultrasound Implant Physical Respiratory Speech
therapy therapy therapy
Panel A. Without county-specific time trends
treat 0.004 -0.009∗ -0.008∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.012 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 1721856 1721856 1721856 1721856 1721856 1721856 1721856
Mean 0.129 0.077 0.061 0.003 0.012 0.074 0.007
Panel B. With county-specific time trends
treat 0.005 -0.011∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.002 -0.000 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.006∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 1721856 1721856 1721856 1721856 1721856 1721856 1721856
Mean 0.129 0.077 0.061 0.003 0.012 0.074 0.007
Notes: Panel A presents a difference-in-difference estimate for each outcome without including the county-specific
trends. Panel B shows the estimates including the county-specific trends. The means of logged outcomes are reported
in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table D.5: Heterogeneity by county-level median household income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid HMO Log(LOS) Log(total charges) Log(total costs) Transfer Mortality
Panel A. Quartile 1
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.301∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.039) (0.091) (0.123) (0.121) (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 1290 976 973 734 1290 688
Mean below cutoff 0.040 52.3 $252,267 $103,430 0.083 0.028
Mean above cutoff 0.324 42.6 $219,470 $81,610 0.099 0.032
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel B. Quartile 2
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.247∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.010 -0.026 0.004 0.013
(0.023) (0.075) (0.089) (0.096) (0.020) (0.021)
Observations 3492 2599 2595 2107 3492 1721
Mean below cutoff 0.032 49.6 $194,713 $77,260 0.120 0.042
Mean above cutoff 0.296 40.1 $157,699 $62,790 0.114 0.036
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel C. Quartile 3
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.158∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.079 0.023 0.011 -0.006
(0.030) (0.091) (0.099) (0.108) (0.023) (0.025)
Observations 1497 1107 1101 939 1497 741
Mean below cutoff 0.019 53.9 $268,293 $98,228 0.064 0.026
Mean above cutoff 0.190 44.9 $214,479 $77,044 0.055 0.033
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Panel D. Quartile 4
Birth weight≥1,200 g 0.118∗∗∗ 0.001 0.050 0.049 0.019 0.027∗
(0.019) (0.071) (0.081) (0.083) (0.020) (0.016)
Observations 3782 2797 2787 2507 3782 1848
Mean below cutoff 0.037 49.5 $232,172 $79,622 0.115 0.033
Mean above cutoff 0.178 40.5 $196,712 $66,658 0.105 0.031
Bandwidth (grams) 200 150 150 150 200 100
Notes: Each panel shows the RD estimates for counties classified into each quartile of a county-level median income
measure. I take an average of median household income levels across zip codes in each county to construct the county-
level income measure. Here, I use county as a service area for a hospital since hospitals typically serve an area larger
than a zip code. In addition to the indicator for birth weight≥1,200 g, each regression includes a linear spline of birth
weight, admission year fixed effects, admission month fixed effects, and hospital county fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are reported. The means of logged outcomes are reported in levels.
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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